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The purpose of this thesis is to research and provide a comprehensive overview of 
contingency contracting practices within the United States as they apply during major 
disaster response scenarios. To do this, we analyzed three major disasters that occurred 
within the last twenty years. These are the Northridge, CA, earthquake of 1994, 
Hurricane Katrina in LA in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy, impacting much of the northeast 
in 2012. We specifically picked these events for several reasons. They are large disasters 
with a voluminous amount of data available, they are geographically dispersed around the 
country, and there was sufficient time between each disaster to allow changes to 
contingency contracting plans and policy to change and be implemented. 
Our research and analysis focused on the events of the disaster itself, what 
contingency contracting preparations were in place prior to the disaster occurring, what 
types of contracts were awarded during the recovery phases, and what types of 
contingency contracting policy and procedure changes were made in in the aftermath of 
the disaster to make the system work more effectively and efficiently. Lastly, during each 
disaster we highlight what worked well and what did not and recommend changes to 
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The first uses of contingency contracting by the United States dates back to the 
American Revolution. During times of extremis, and when demand and requirements 
have overwhelmed existing resources, the United States government has frequently 
looked to commercial sources to contract for goods and services. During the Revolution, 
things such as food, transportation, and weapons were routinely contracted for from 
commercial sources (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP] website).  
 American conflicts and the estimated number of contractors supporting the wars 
are shown in Table 1. Since the Revolution, there have been varying degrees of reliance 
on contractors for wartimes support; however, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars show an 
incredibly high ratio of support; a near 1:1 contractor to military personnel average 
during the time period from which this data was derived (DPAP website).  
 
 War/Conflict Contracted Personnel Military Ratio 
Revolution 1,500 (Est) 9,000 1:6 (Est) 
Mexican/American 6,000 (Est) 33,000 1:6 (Est) 
Civil War 200,000 (Est) 1,000,000 1:5 (Est) 
World War I 85,000 2,000,000 1:20 
World War II 734,000 5,400,000 1:7 
Korea 156,000 393,000 1:2.5 
Vietnam 70,000 359,000 1:6 
Persian Gulf War 5,200 541,000 1:100 
Rwanda/Somalia/Haiti No Records Kept N/A N/A 
Balkans 5,000–20,000 (Varied) 20,000 Up to 1.5:1 
Iraq 95,461 95,900 1:1 
Afghanistan 112,092 79,100 1.42:1 
Table 1.   Wartime Use of Contractors During American Conflicts  
(from DPAP Contingency Contracting website) 
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The first use of contingency contracting during CONUS disaster relief efforts is 
more difficult to determine. Probably the first disaster relief type legislation passed in the 
United States was the Congressional Act of 1803, which provided assistance to a New 
Hampshire town following a very destructive fire. For almost 100 years following the 
1803 Act, ad hoc legislation was passed more than 100 times in response to hurricanes, 
earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters. Detailed information on contingency 
contracting during CONUS disasters and emergencies during the 18th and 19th centuries 
is largely unrecorded. However, due to the magnitude of some events (such as the 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood of 1889; the Galveston, Texas, hurricane of 1900; and 
the San Francisco, California, earthquake of 1906), it is reasonable to assume that the 
relief efforts included contracting for services such as debris removal, temporary shelters, 
and medical support. Although contingency contracting policies and regulations at the 
state and federal levels were probably near non-existent at the time, contracting actions 
almost certainly occurred due to the need to act quickly to save lives and property.  
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to review several CONUS disasters during the last 
twenty years and analyze the use of government contingency contracting to determine if 
it was effective during the preparations and response to the disaster. For each disaster, we 
will review: 
 Storm/earthquake development and impact 
 Preparation plans (local, state, and federal)  
 Immediate and long-term response  
 Contingency contracting support 
 Funding support 
 Analysis of response and contingency contracting 
 Lessons learned and recommendations 
This assessment will examine the 1994 Northridge earthquake that occurred in the 
Southern California region of Los Angeles County, California, Hurricane Katrina (2005), 
which bought great devastation to the United States’ Gulf Coast, primarily New Orleans, 
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Louisiana, and the most recent CONUS disaster, Hurricane Sandy, which in 2012 
devastated a significant portion of the east coast, especially areas in New York and New 
Jersey. For each disaster, several factors related to contingency contracting will be 
discussed in addition to the history of the events. For example, prior to the earthquakes 
and hurricanes occurring, the impacted cities may have developed contingency 
contracting or planning methods to prepare for the events. Furthermore, after the events, 
contingency contracting or planning methods may have been bolstered further.  
Additionally, the processes of immediate response for each disaster will be 
addressed. Immediate response includes the strategies employed by local, state and 
federal responders, such as communicating to the public, garnering federal interest, and 
responding to injuries or lives at-risk in the initial hours after the event has occurred. 
Next, the analysis will discuss the long-term response for each crisis, which includes the 
local, state, federal, and military actions that occurred subsequent to the immediate 
response.  
Other components of the assessment are the organizational structures and 
response coordination strategies employed in Northridge, the Gulf Coast, and the east 
coast when the disasters struck. Various organizational structures and response 
coordination plans have been used over the years, some more successful than others. An 
enduring problem with disaster response has been how to effectively coordinate federal, 
state and local responses to ensure resources are not wasted and efforts are not 
fragmented and uncoordinated. We will analyze the systems used during these disasters 
and assess their level of efficiency and effectiveness.  
In terms of funding, we will examine the basic sources of funding and what 
challenges existed getting the funds released for use. These sections will examine what 
the sources of money are, and the amount awarded in specific areas such as debris 
removal, sanitation, food and water distribution, construction, rebuilding and demolition.  
This report will also consider the types of policy changes that have been 
implemented as a result of these disasters. All of these disasters, in particular Hurricane 
Katrina, have contributed to contingency contracting policy changes. Policy changes 
 4
include local, state, and federal shifts in policy that are a direct result of response failures 
and lessons learned.  
During all of these disasters, there have been many hard lessons learned and 
weaknesses exposed in local, state, and federal preparations and response plans. Despite 
these challenges, there have been many successes also. We will also highlight the areas of 
strength and success in the disaster responses and particularly in contingency contracting 
preparations and response.  
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
Several factors define the scope of this thesis. Contingency contracting has been 
used many times during the last twenty years in response to CONUS natural disasters 
(DPAP website). However, in order to maintain focus and in-depth research, we will only 
report on the three natural disasters already mentioned. Additionally, it should be noted 
that the three disasters we are reporting on were immense in magnitude and all quickly 
overwhelmed readily available resources. Had we analyzed smaller disasters, the results 
of our research would be much different. 
We will also largely focus on the responses and contracting actions of the larger 
federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of 
Defense (DOD), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE). The actions of state and local agencies will also be 
covered, but to a lesser degree when compared to the federal agencies. Given the scale of 
the disasters we are researching and reporting on, the federal government is the primary 
source of response coordination when it comes to contingency contracting and funding 
the costly responses to these disasters. Therefore, we will focus the preponderance of our 
efforts on federal response. 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our methodology consisted largely of literary searches for information on disaster 
response and contingency contracting information at the local, state and federal level. The 
use of government websites such as FEMA, DHS, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and 
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the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) were very useful for 
developing background information on standing organizational structures, response plans 
and contingency contracting policy and regulations.  
Government documents such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Emergency Acquisitions Guide, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Stafford Act 
report, and the DHS National Official Response Plan were also used for our research. 
After action reports from local, state and federal agencies for each disaster were excellent 
sources of detailed information on contingency contracting efforts and lessons learned. 
Other sources of information consisted of local newspaper articles, magazines, and online 
news sources.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF PROJECT REPORT 
The organization of this thesis consists of an introduction (Chapter I) that 
addresses the historical background of contingency contracting, purpose, scope, 
methodology and organization of the report. Chapter II addresses standing policy and 
regulations and the various organizations that typically respond to disasters and are 
involved in the contracting efforts. Chapters III, IV, and V address Northridge, Katrina, 
and Sandy, respectively. Each chapter follows the same organization, presenting an 
introduction, the events of the disaster, preparations, response, contingency contracting 
support, funding, analysis of the response and contingency contracting, lessons learned 
and recommendations and, finally, a chapter summary. Chapter VI is the final chapter 
and is titled “Conclusions and Recommendations.” The final chapter compares and 
contrasts the responses of the three disasters and highlights the lessons learned, repeated 
failures and areas that have shown improvement. Lastly, we make recommendations for 
changes to response and contingency contacting policies and regulations. 
 6
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II. UNITED STATES DISASTER RESPONSE AND 
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING HISTORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If a major theme is indicated from the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the 2005 
Hurricane Katrina, and the 2012 Hurricane Sandy, it would be constant evolution in 
terms of contingency contracting preparations and planning. Based on these events 
spanning over 18 years, it is evident that contingency contracting planning and execution 
is constantly evolving. Throughout the past few decades, there have been successes and 
challenges faced by organizations and agencies involved in CONUS disaster contingency 
contracting. Therefore, analyzing the evolution of contingency contracting is significant 
in identifying where organizations went wrong, where they exceled, and what changes 
were made over time.  
B. THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
FEMA can trace its beginnings to the Congressional Act of 1803 (FEMA). The 
Congressional Act of 1803 is generally considered the first piece of disaster legislation 
and provided assistance to a New Hampshire town following an extensive fire (FEMA). 
For almost 100 years following the Act, ad hoc legislation was passed more than 100 
times in response to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters. It 
appeared that the U.S. wanted to re-invent the wheel with every disaster. It was not until 
the 1930s that a federal approach to disasters became more consistent. In the 1930s, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation was given authority to make disaster loans for repair 
and reconstruction of certain public facilities following disasters.  
In 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads was given authority to provide 
funding for highways and bridges damaged by natural disasters. The Flood 
Control Act, which gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers greater 
authority to implement flood control projects, was also passed. This 
piecemeal approach to disaster assistance was problematic and it prompted 
legislation that required greater cooperation between Federal agencies and 
authorized the President to coordinate these activities. (FEMA) 
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Through the years, emergency and disaster activities remained fragmented and 
many parallel programs and policies existed at the State and local levels, compounding 
the complexity of Federal disaster relief efforts. It was not until the late 1970s that the 
National Governor’s Association sought to decrease the many agencies with which state 
and local governments were forced to work (FEMA). Therefore, President Carter created 
executive order 12127 in 1979, in which “merged many of the separate disaster-related 
responsibilities into the Federal Emergency Management Agency” (FEMA). 
FEMA began development of an Integrated Emergency Management System with 
an all-hazards approach that included “direction, control and warning systems which are 
common to the full range of emergencies from small isolated events to the ultimate 
emergency ‘war’” (FEMA). 
Unfortunately, it took the end of the Cold War and the direction of Mr. James L 
Witt to move FEMA toward streamlined disaster relief and recovery operations and a 
new emphasis regarding preparedness and mitigation and a focus on agency employees’ 
customer service (FEMA). Almost 10 years later, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, moved the agency toward issues of national preparedness and homeland security 
and tested the agency in unprecedented ways. “The Agency coordinated its activities with 
the newly formed Office of Homeland Security, and FEMA’s Office of National 
Preparedness was given responsibility for helping to ensure that the Nation’s first 
responders were trained and equipped to deal with weapons of mass destruction” 
(FEMA). 
C. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act by Congress in November 2002, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) formally came into being as a stand-alone, 
Cabinet-level department to further coordinate and unify national homeland security 
efforts, opening its doors on March 1, 2003. Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was 
appointed as the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House. 
The office oversaw and coordinated a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the 
country against terrorism and respond to any future attacks. It has since become so much 
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more. It was then that “FEMA joined 22 other Federal agencies, programs, and offices in 
becoming the Department of Homeland Security” (FEMA). 
While significant progress had been made between 1803 and 2003, it took yet 
another disaster to better structure the department.  
On October 4, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. The act significantly 
reorganized FEMA, provided it with substantial new authority to remedy 
gaps that became apparent in the response to Hurricane Katrina in August 
2005, the most devastating natural disaster in U.S. history, and included a 
more robust preparedness mission for FEMA. (FEMA) 
D. THE STAFFORD ACT 
Current Contingency Contracting guidance has been derived from the Stafford 
Act. In an effort to better serve those in need, the government enacted the Robert T 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (Public Law 93–288 as amended). 
According to FEMA, the “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act, PL 100–707, signed into law November 23, 1988; amended the Disaster Relief Act 
of 1974, PL 93–288… constitutes the statutory authority for most Federal disaster 
response activities especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs” (FEMA). 
Both The Stafford and Post-Katrina Acts provide DHS with the guidance 
necessary to carry out its tasking. By drilling down through DHS, one will discover that 
the laws have guided DHS to create a multi-tier approach to handle national emergencies. 
As such, it not only has incorporated the Federal Emergency Management System 
(FEMA), a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) but also an Emergency 
Services Sector.  
The Security Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), 
October 13, 2006 and The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007 (Public Law 110–53) were both significant events. The SAFE Port Act built on 
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, focusing on the 
reorganization of the grant process as administered by FEMA. The Act also reorganized 
intelligence operations at the Department, elevating the Assistant Secretary for 
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Intelligence and Analysis to the Under Secretary level, requiring Senate confirmation. 
Additionally, many of the features of the new homeland security architecture align with 
recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission Report. 
E. THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN  
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is comprised of 18 Sector 
Specific Plans (SSPs) specifically developed to focus on protection of the nation’s assets 
(DHS). It helps to prioritize the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
(CIKR) and the resources allocated to each CIKR. The NIPP: 
provides a unifying framework that integrates a range of efforts designed 
to enhance the safety of our nation’s critical infrastructure. The 
overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more 
resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the 
effects of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, and to strengthen national 
preparedness, response, and recovery in the event of an emergency. 
(Johnson 2) 
First released in 2006, the revised NIPP integrates the concepts of resilience and 
protection, and broadens the focus of NIPP-related programs and activities to an all-
hazards environment. It was developed by critical infrastructure partners including 
federal departments and agencies, state and local government agencies, and private sector 
entities, but the DHS website does not give a specific list of all participants. The DHS 
oversees NIPP management and implementation. 
In 2010, The Emergency Services Sector Specific Plan was developed (DHS). 
The Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan “details how the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan risk management framework is implemented within the context of the 
unique characteristics and risk landscape of the sector” (Johnson 2). 
Each Sector-Specific Agency develops a sector-specific plan through a 
coordinated effort involving its public and private sector partners. The Department of 
Homeland Security is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Emergency 
Services Sector.  
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Each Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) details how the each sector is to conduct risk 
management framework is implemented within the context of the unique characteristics 
and risk landscape of each critical infrastructure sector. Each Sector-Specific Agency has 
supposedly developed a SSP through a coordinated effort involving its public and private 
sector partners, yet this group had difficulty finding proof of the collaborative effort. 
The NIPP, National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG), and the National Response 
Framework (NRF) all provide a comprehensive, integrated approach to the homeland 
security mission. “The NIPP establishes the overall risk-informed approach that defines 
the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) protection posture, while 
the NRF provides the approach for domestic incident management. The NPG sets forth 
national priorities, doctrine, and roles and responsibilities for building capabilities across 
the prevention, protection, response, and recovery mission areas” (Johnson 2). 
The NRF is implemented to guide overall coordination of domestic incident 
management activities. Figure 1 depicts the NRF table of organization and information 
flow during incidents and responses. NIPP partnerships and processes provide the 
foundation for the CIKR dimension of the NRF, facilitating threat and incident 
management across a spectrum of activities, including incident prevention, response, and 
recovery. The NPG is implemented through the application of target capabilities during 
the course of assessment, planning, training, exercises, grants, and technical assistance 
activities. Implementation of the NIPP is both a national preparedness priority and a 





Figure 1.  The National Response Framework (from DHS website) 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The recent evolution and maturation of disaster response planning within the 
United States is impressive but prior to 1974 it was cumbersome and fragmented. For 
about one hundred and fifty years the country plodded through disaster relief, 
“reinventing the wheel” each time and putting very little effort into establishing a formal 
response plan. That began to change slowly in the 1900s and with the Stafford Act of 
1974, post 9–11 NIPP and NRF plans and post Katrina changes, we have made quantum 
leaps in planning for and executing disaster relief during the last twelve years. More 
changes are sure to follow, particularly after we deal with the unknown disasters that the 
United States will most certainly face in the future.  
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III. NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE (1994) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At 4:30:55 AM Pacific Standard Time on January 17, 1994, a significant 
earthquake impacted the area 20 miles west-northwest of Los Angeles and one mile 
south-southwest of Northridge, California (DeBlasio et al. 6). As depicted in Figures 2 
and 3, the epicenter of the earthquake occurred at 34° 12.80’ N, 118° 32.22’ W. 
According to the United States Geological Survey, the earthquake that hit Northridge, 
California was a Magnitude 6.7 earthquake. The recorded depth of the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake is 18.4 kilometers (DeBlasio et al. 6). Experts identify the Northridge Thrust 
fault line as the main cause of the earthquake; however, several other surrounding  
fault lines experienced minor rupturing during aftershocks as well as triggered slips  
(DeBlasio et al. 7).  
 
Figure 2.  Northridge earthquake epicenter and surrounding areas  
(from Dewey 85) 
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Figure 3.  Northridge epicenter and surrounding areas  
(from Mehmet and Brown 94)  
B. THE EARTHQUAKE AND PREPARATIONS 
The Northridge earthquake occurred on Monday, January 17, 1994, at 
approximately 4:30 a.m. in Reseda, a neighborhood in the city of Los Angeles, 
California. Although earthquakes are common in California, and some are even larger 
than the recorded 6.7 magnitude of the Northridge event, the significance of the 
Northridge earthquake was the location of the epicenter, which happened to be in a 
heavily populated area. Reports demonstrate that more than 2,100 square miles and 
50 cities were affected by the Northridge Earthquake (Shinozuka et al. 65). Considering 
the actual earthquake lasted less than one minute, it was responsible for causing damage 
to over 114,000 residential and commercial structures and resulted in more than 70 deaths 
and 9,000 injuries. More than 27,000 people were left homeless (United States 
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Department of Transportation). It brought the Los Angeles county transportation system 
to a grinding halt, generating tremendous damage and resulting in a year’s worth of 
construction and rebuilding to repair the infrastructure. FEMA reported initial cost 
estimates and total damages of the Northridge at $25 billion (FEMA). The actual cost of 
the earthquake was set at $42 billion by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). This made the Northridge earthquake one of the largest and 
most expensive natural disasters in United States history (FEMA). 
While there has been more powerful seismic activity, the Northridge earthquake 
caused the most large-scale damage throughout the greater Los Angeles area. This was 
due to the quake epicenter being focused in a highly populated area and a highly traveled 
transportation area (DeBlasio 7). Damages resulting from the earthquake prompted many 
organizations and industries to react to issues regarding their specific fields, including 
water and power, transportation, and debris removal. For example, the Northridge 
earthquake caused over 300,000 households to lose power, water, or both resources, 
according to the United States Chamber of Commerce Foundation (4). This substantial 
loss of utilities was recorded as the largest blackout in Los Angeles history. In addition, 
sewage systems were also affected for well over a decade after the earthquake hit (Nahai 
12). These types of problems call for both short and long-term contingency contracting 
solutions. 
The earthquake caused considerable damage and destruction to the highway 
system in the San Fernando Valley. It placed an immediate and significant strain on auto-
dependent Southern California (DeBlasio et al. 12). Since the highway system is such a 
significant part of the county infrastructure and transportation corridor throughout 
Southern California, government agencies responded quickly to the crisis. In fact, 
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) was the first to respond with 
construction contracts to remove rubble and rebuild the county highways and key 
infrastructure. By the evening of January 17, construction crews had already begun 
clearing rubble, removing debris, and demolition of irreparable highway bridges 
(DeBlasio et al. 13). By January 20, the Southern California Regional Rail Authority 
(SCRRA) increased Metrolink commuter rail ridership to Lancaster in the north and 
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Ventura County in the west (United States Department of Transportation). The 
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) changed bus services throughout the county, 
shuttle services were implemented, highway detours where set up, and many companies 
offered their employees free shuttle service (United States Department of 
Transportation).  Federal, state, local governments and construction contractors worked 
in close partnership to reconstruct the highway system in record time. According to the 
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)/Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) (1995), “Everyone involved was driven by the desire to be part of the recovery 
effort, and take pride in showing what we could do” (5). 
Caltrans was a leader in the reconstruction effort to rebuild the damaged 
transportation system. The Department also retained traveler mobility by keeping traffic 
flowing as smoothly as possible throughout the rebuilding efforts (Federal Highway 
Administration). 
Prior to the earthquake occurring, the area of Northridge, California, had 
experienced several natural disasters. For example, major wild fires, mudslides, and 
floods occurred only weeks before the Northridge earthquake. Additionally, less than two 
years before the earthquake, the Los Angeles area faced riot situations that required 
contracts from local, state, and federal agencies to aid the State of California in a major 
disaster. In fact, the Northridge earthquake was the third time in only three months that 
disaster response was needed in the Los Angeles area. Therefore, one could assume the 
State of California is well versed in disaster response.  
According to the United States Geological Survey, the Northridge earthquake 
produced the strongest ground motions ever instrumentally recorded in a densely 
populated region in the United States as well as the entire continent of North America 
(2014). In the aftermath of the Northridge earthquake, major freeways collapsed, parking 
structures and office buildings imploded, and countless homes were lost as a result of 
irreparable damage. In comparison to other U.S. disasters, including 2005 Hurricane 
Katina and 2012 Hurricane Sandy, the Northridge earthquake ranks third as one of the 
most expensive natural disasters in the history of the United States in terms of disaster 
relief and financial loss (FEMA).  
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In detail, the damage of the Northridge earthquake included destruction of at least 
eight freeways in the Southern California region (Federal Highway Administration). One 
of these freeways was Interstate 5, which is a major interchange in the United States. 
Because of this reality, hundreds of thousands of Los Angeles citizens lost access to the 
northern area of the county. Traffic was also deterred in Los Angeles’ west side, as the 
Santa Monica Freeway also collapsed (DeBlasio et al. 13). In regard to landmarks and 
notable buildings, the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum was subjected to damage 
amounting to at least $44 million. Additionally, the Northridge campus of California 
State University experienced great devastation as a result of the Northridge earthquake. 
Perhaps the most alarming statistic from the Northridge event was the amount of people 
in peril after the earthquake hit. Nearly 700,000 individuals residing in the area requested 
local, state, or federal assistance (FEMA).  
Earthquakes are difficult to predict, and the Northridge earthquake was no 
exception to this disadvantage. However, contingency planning can address predictable 
outcomes of future earthquakes based on what was experienced in the past, such as with 
the Northridge earthquake. Despite the devastation and loss that occurred as a result of 
the Northridge earthquake, experts predict that California will eventually experience a 
much larger earthquake with even more detrimental results. Therefore, it is evident that 
not only the State of California, but also federal disaster response agencies should 
consider the lessons learned from the 1994 incident and develop strategies to combat 
even more severe situations that could possibly occur at any time.  
For example, earthquake mitigation efforts have been demonstrated over the past 
19 years since the Northridge event. One of these improvements is implementing better 
emergency response. Additionally, hospitals are more structurally sound to deal with the 
impact of an earthquake and can support the requirement of emergency services needed 
when an earthquake occurs. As a final preemptive measure regarding the region’s 
earthquake-prone status, the State of California requires that new buildings are built with 
retrofits, which prevents buildings from collapsing easily and can decrease the amount of 
causalities in the event of another significant and sizable earthquake (Detwiler 3).  
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According to FEMA, “For many older facilities, one mitigation option to protect against 
seismic hazards is the seismic rehabilitation of existing structural elements.” Perhaps the 
only benefit of the Northridge earthquake was providing lessons to improve the safety 
and security of the region if another earthquake of this magnitude hits in a densely 
populated region once again.  
As previously mentioned, the Northridge earthquake served as a lesson for local, 
state, and federal disaster response agencies from which to learn. For instance, one of the 
lessons learned that was demonstrated by the Northridge earthquake is that when an 
earthquake hits beneath a densely populated area, it will be subjected to ground motions 
with peak accelerations approaching the force of gravity, exceeding the levels of shaking 
anticipated by building codes. Based on this reality, mitigation and preemptive planning 
to prevent the damage of earthquakes in the region can be conducted more accurately. 
This is an issue that can be prepared for in advance to prevent destruction and loss of life 
in subsequent earthquake events. In addition, understanding the requirements for both 
prevention and response to earthquakes will serve as the foundation for contingency 
contracting on the local, state, and federal levels.  
For example, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 established the 
guidelines of contingency contracting prior to the Northridge earthquake and is still 
implemented in the present day. According to the United States Coast Guard (USCG): 
As required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the 
NRF establishes a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident 
management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The NRF is an all-hazards 
plan built on the template of the NIMS. The NIMS provides a consistent 
doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels 
regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident. (Murphy 217) 




C. RESPONSE: IMMEDIATE AND LONG TERM  
Based on the severity of the 1994 Northridge earthquake, a rapid and robust 
response was needed to rectify the damage and other issues caused by the event. For 
example, the Los Angeles County Fire Department deployed its 56-person FEMA Urban 
Search and Rescue (USAR) Task Force and other resources to assist the Los Angeles 
City Fire Department and helped manage mutual aid resources from across the nation 
(FEMA). This was the beginning of a disaster response that would prove lengthy, costly 
and comprehensive for both the county and the nation. The following sections discuss the 
local, state, and Federal efforts employed to respond to the Northridge disaster.  
All three aspects of government-based disaster recovery—federal, state, and 
local—were employed to respond to the Northridge earthquake in 1994. Additionally, 
industry leaders and local organizations applied hands-on support in the earliest phases of 
recovery. The Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Governor of California, the Director of 
Caltrans, and the Mayor of Los Angeles were among the major role models during the 
crisis.  
As Table 2 indicates, the immediate recovery response to the earthquake was 
rapid at all levels. One hour after the Northridge earthquake occurred, the California 
National Guard headquarters was contacted by the State of California’s Office of 










Time Elapsed Time Event/Actions Taken 
4:30 AM 0 minutes An earthquake of a magnitude of 6.7 occurred in the 
Los Angeles area, centered in Northridge. Damage 
spread over 2,100 square miles and through three 
different counties. 
4:31 AM 1 minute An aftershock occurred at a magnitude of 5.9. 
4:35 AM 5 minutes Los Angeles City and County Emergency 
Operations Centers are activated. 
4:45 AM 15 minutes FEMA Response began. 
5:45 AM 1 hour, 15 minutes Los Angeles Mayor Riordan declared a state of 
emergency. 
6:00 AM 1 hour, 30 minutes FEMA Headquarters Emergency Support Team was 
activated. 
6:45 AM 1 hour, 45 minutes As many as 50 structural fires were reported, in 
addition to numerous ruptures in water and natural 
gas mains. Power outages reported 
9:05 AM 4 hours, 35 minutes California Governor Pete Wilson declared a State of 
Emergency. 
9:45 AM 4 hours, 45 minutes All active fires were under control. 
2:08 PM 9 hours, 38 minutes President Clinton declared a national disaster for 
Los Angeles County. 
7:00 PM 14 hours, 30 
minutes 
First of several contracts put in place and crews 
began work on debris clearance and highway 
demolition. 
Table 2.   Northridge earthquake immediate response timeline (from FEMA website) 
By employing an Incident Command System (ICS), FEMA was able to coordinate 
the response of nearly 30 federal agencies to respond to the Northridge earthquake 
disaster. Collaboration of all of these agencies enabled decisions to be made and 
processes to occur quickly without bureaucratic interference. Although financial 
challenges were present, the cooperation of FEMA and the other several agencies 
coordinating the disaster relief were able to overcome them and respond in a timely 
fashion. FEMA contributed greatly toward the response to the Northridge disaster by 
distributing emergency equipment and supplies at various locations. Additionally, FEMA 
established an Earthquake Service Center that consisted of specialists from disaster 
agencies on local, state, and federal levels. Once this center was operating, it provided aid 
to victims continuously through the next several days. FEMA was a valuable component 
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of the restructuring processes as well. For instance, FEMA’s insight into transportation 
and financial decision making was vital. In addition to rebuilding after the disaster 
occurred, FEMA executed stellar communication to the public, disseminating 
information pertinent to safety and survival, which may have diverted hysteria or other 
unproductive behaviors, such as rioting, looting, etc., in the Los Angeles region (FEMA). 
One of the greatest impacts from the Northridge earthquake was the destruction of 
highways and freeway systems vital to the effective transportation of Los Angeles 
residents (Figure 4). Prior to the Northridge earthquake occurring, Federal highway aid 
was implemented by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in 1977 and the 
FHWA forged a strong relationship with Caltrans, the state-operated transportation 
organization in the State of California (DeBlasio et al. 14). This partnership developed 
the Federal Aid Highway Program, which would play a significant part in rebuilding the 
freeways in California in response to the Northridge earthquake almost 20 years later 
(DeBlasio et al. 14). 
 
Figure 4.  Northridge earthquake freeway damage (from Mehmet and Brown 98) 
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Once the Northridge earthquake occurred, the preemptive measures of the FHWA 
and Caltrans proved beneficial. Immediately after the Northridge earthquake, $45 million 
was provided for debris cleanup as well as demolition efforts (Federal Highway 
Administration). Additionally, the organizations designated nearly $100 million for 
transit funds, specifically regarding the Metrolink public transportation system and 
freeway rebuilding endeavors. At the end of the rebuilding project, the FHWA estimated 
approximately $350 million was released to respond to the destruction of the Northridge 
earthquake. 
Loss of power and water were major issues after the earthquake occurred. Not 
only were many individuals, families, and even businesses affected by a disruption in 
power and water supply, it challenged response teams because inadequate 
communication was available with the resulting electrical blackout, and without water, 
rescue efforts were strained. Thus, an immediate need to restore utilities, including 
telephone lines, existed. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the Caltrans 
Traffic Management Center (TMC) used backup electrical generators for power and 
relied on landline telephones for primary communications to coordinate their efforts 
(Quake 29). Additionally, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LAWAP) 
played an instrumental role in immediate response to restore both power and water to the 
greater Los Angeles area (Nahai 9). Figure 5 demonstrates the success in power 
restoration after the earthquake made by LAWAP and indicates that power was restored 
to 100% of their customers within four days of the earthquake, a very impressive figure 
when compared to Hurricane’s Katrina and Sandy where it took months to restore all 




Figure 5.   Northridge earthquake, power restoration timeline  
(from Shinozuka et al. 73) 
D. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP  
The organizational structure and leadership that existed once the Northridge 
earthquake occurred was effective. The Northridge earthquake presented a need for an 
effective incident management model. In conjunction with leadership and organization 
from FEMA and an Incident Command System (ICS), which is a standardized incident 
management approach, an all-risk system was developed to address the specific needs of 
the Northridge earthquake damage (FEMA). FEMA, utilizing an ICS led the overall 
California response to the earthquake and by most accounts was effective.  
Preparation and past key events were significant aids in the organization of the 
Northridge earthquake response. For example, the City of Los Angeles already had 
established an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) after the Los Angeles riots that had 
occurred only two years prior to the Northridge earthquake. Because of the EOC’s 
existence, rapid organization and a coordinated response occurred quickly when the 
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Northridge earthquake hit the region. Within five minutes of the initial earthquake 
tremors in Northridge, the EOC was alerted and began earthquake operations (FEMA). 
For instance, the EOC initiated vital decision-making processes and facilitated the flow 
of information through productive communication channels. Within the communication 
networks, local public works agencies, fire departments, police departments, building and 
safety organizations, and the local transportation agency, Los Angeles Department of 
Transportation (LADOT) began cooperating with city officials and the office of the 
Mayor of Los Angeles. In addition to the organization and leadership of these 
organizations, further assistance and leadership was presented by the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department, the California Highway Patrol (CHP), Caltrans, and the Los 
Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Agency (MTA) (Department of Transportation). 
The next level of organization and strategy included a rescue plan that consisted 
of rescue efforts, debris removal, and demolition. This plan proved to be effective and 
efficient and it clearly defined each organization’s role in rescuing and reviving the city. 
Due to the evolving conditions of the situation and environment during the rescue efforts, 
the plan was regularly updated to reflect the understanding of the unique needs of the 
situation. The guidance from the leaders identified previously was significant in terms of 
effectiveness and ensuring the safety of rescue crews (FEMA).  
E. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT  
Because of the burden placed on the transportation system of Southern California 
in the wake of the Northridge earthquake, contingency contracting was necessary to 
respond to the devastation. Only 15 hours after the earthquake occurred, the first 
contracts were initiated, prompting the beginning of lengthy and costly efforts to conduct 
demolition efforts and remove debris (United States Department of Transportation). 
Some of the more significant contracts executed for the earthquake response were for 
supporting Caltrans. Once Caltrans completed its analysis of the damage of the major 
transportation systems, contracts were developed and awarded to initiate the rebuilding of 
the damaged highway networks (United States Department of Transportation).  
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When developing debris removal contingency contracts, the State of California 
follows specific criteria. The first step in estimating costs is preparing an estimate of the 
types and quantities of debris to be removed. Secondly, the analysis must identify the 
locations of the debris. The final phase of analyzing what is typically needed to develop 
contracts is the determination of unit cost data for the contracted item (Mortenson 222). 
With a significant amount of building demolition required in the greater Los Angeles 
area, contingency contracts were used with great success during the Northridge 
earthquake response. The City of Los Angeles and the State of California required 
contracts to address recycling of demolition materials to the greatest extent without 
delaying the demolition project, which helped restore the region more expediently. The 
contract provisioning was uniform and consistent across multiple agencies. Some 
examples of the contract provisions are as follows:  
 “Summarize and document the amounts and types of materials directly 
recycled and material removed from the site on the enclosed recycling log 
found within this Contract. Documentation includes receipts of materials 
sold, etc.”  
 “Identify loads to (site) as “City Demolition Debris,” state the demolition 
site address, and pay all allocated fees. Copies of weight tickets from the 
previous day’s work will be collected at the demolition site on a regular 
basis by a representative from the Integrated Solid Waste Management 
Office. Copies of weight tickets must also be turned in to the Engineer at 
the completion of the project.” (Mortensen 223)  
Both the city and state issued contracts that addressed debris removal as a unit price 
contract. The following contract provisions are related to recycling disaster debris: 
 “Incentive payment: The City will pay tipping fees using the existing 
authorization letter; however, only source separated recycling facilities 
and (name of recycling facility) (mixed debris recycling) will be 
authorized. Contractors will receive an incentive (10% of unit price) to use 
source separated facilities, since the City saves over $200 per load when 
using these types of facilities.” 
 “Collection plan: The Contractor will submit a “Collection Plan” that 
details how the debris will be collected as well as specifics on equipment 
and personnel that will be utilized.” 
 “City Inspectors will ensure that the Contractor implements the Collection 
Plan. This will include ensuring that all debris is collected, that Contractor 
mobilized equipment greater than or equal to equipment bid in Collection 
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Plan, as well as ensuring that the Contractor conducts work in a safe 
manner.” (Mortensen 223) 
As stated earlier, the Northridge earthquake presented the largest blackout ever 
seen by the Los Angeles area, however, effective contingency planning and contracting 
enabled swift restoration of power throughout the area (Shinozuka et al. 78). Restoration 
of electricity throughout the area was made possible through contingency planning as 
well as both pre-event and post-event assessments and rehabilitation strategies on behalf 
of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LAWAP). 
According to Shinozuka et al. in 2003, system performance criteria and 
requirements of LAWAP include a majority of preparedness and restoration regarding 
power, water, and hospital resources. For example, prior to an event occurring, the 
reliability of power, water, and hospital resources are all at 99% per year (Shinozuka et 
al. 72). Additionally, post-event response and recovery demonstrates high rates of 
reliability for power, water, and hospital resources, which show a 90% success rate on 
behalf of LAWAP (Shinozuka et al. 72). Furthermore, the swiftness in restoration of 
power, water, and hospital resources during events comparable to the Northridge 
earthquake indicate that power is usually restored in 95 percent of households within 
three days, water is restored in 95 percent of households within three days, and all 
emergency facilities are restored within 24 hours (Shinozuka et al. 74).  
More specifically, response regarding water and power during the Northridge 
earthquake was incredibly effective as a result of accurate and comprehensive 
contingency contracting. In fact, most power and water resources disabled by the 
earthquake were restored within the first 24 hours after the event, demonstrating that 
despite the magnitude of the earthquake and the size and affected radius of power and 
water disruption, LAWAP was able to eradicate the issues with water and power supplies 
quickly with sound contingency contracting in place. Contingency contracting efforts in 
this instance include risk assessment, business impact analysis, defining and selecting 
strategies of response, planning development and execution, and routine testing or 
exercising the plan to ensure relevancy (U.S. Chamber of Commerce).  
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Contingency contracting to restore immediate sewage issues resulting from the 
Northridge earthquake were equally effective; however, long-term damage was 
experienced in the Los Angeles area for over a decade after the earthquake. For instance, 
in 2003, the City of Los Angeles established a contract of nearly a million dollars to 
make repairs that were not deemed emergencies in 1994. Once the contract was 
established, excavation, shoring up and replacement of sewer systems commenced (Los 
Times Staff Reports). In addition, residential sewer systems were restored, including 
housing sewage connections (Times Staff Reports). 
F. FUNDING  
As previously mentioned, the Federal Highway Administration released funds 
immediately to address the destruction of the highways as well as debris removal and 
demolition efforts. Caltrans was then tasked with completely rebuilding the freeway 
network to sustain the traffic patterns that occurred prior to the Northridge earthquake. 
These contracts were made in good faith (DeBlasio et al. 10).  
A significant good faith contract was set in place to address traffic management 
and reengineering. In the good faith contact that was developed with the Caltrans 
engineers, a Traffic Management Plan (TMP) was created. Within this TMP, efforts to 
coordinate traffic operations for the entire Los Angeles region were addressed. 
Additionally, according to (DeBlasio et al. 10): 
 The Caltrans TMC was the initial site of traffic management following the 
earthquake. Besides its traffic monitoring capabilities (CCTV and traffic 
counters), the TMC deployed the FSP, which is jointly run by Caltrans, 
the LADOT, and the CHP. As was discussed earlier, directly following the 
earthquake, the FSP deployed 157 tow trucks to the regional freeway 
system and extended their regular peak commute hours. The tow trucks 
were equipped with radios and a mobile traffic data terminal, which 
allowed the drivers to communicate with dispatchers at the TMC. In 
January 1994, the freeway service patrol assisted about 1,250 motorists. 
That number peaked at about 4,100 in March 1994, or 14,898 total 
motorists from January–May 1994. 
The reconstruction was primarily funded by this good faith contracts as well as 
emergency reserve funds that were established in the event of an earthquake or other 
natural or societal disaster was to occur.   
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In terms of funding debris and demolition of buildings in residential and 
commercial areas, FEMA responded by funding these endeavors as well as tipping fees 
and the cost of administration personnel and contractors (Table 3). Additionally, FEMA 
provided funding for recycling, as it is the policy of the State of California, specifically 
the City of Los Angeles, to reduce litter and recycle. These policies were overseen and 
implemented by the California Integrated Waste Management Board (CIWMB), which 
has since been disbanded and reformed and is currently known as the California 
Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (Quake 29). 
 
Table 3.   Northridge earthquake, FEMA funding. Note that items  
italicized have not been included in the direct loss estimate  
(from FEMA website) 
*Estimated portion of direct loss reimbursements for public assistance program = USD 4 billion. 
This excludes indirect loss reimbursements, such as debris removal and emergency services. 
Table 5 sets out the current details of reimbursements from FEMA, dated January 31, 2000, totaling USD 6.957 billion. 
Other federal expenditure amounted to USD 6.043 billion, of which some costs relate to the Small Business Administration 
loans and hazard mitigation projects. Direct reimbursements from FEMA have been estimated at USD 5.193 billion and 
those from other agencies USD 1.098 billion, totaling 6.291 billion for direct federal reimbursements. By the close of 1994, 
FEMA reported that some 667,801 Southern Californians had applied for federal aid, three times as many as following 




Although FEMA plays a key role in disaster assistance; other agencies such as the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) are among those that also play a 
role. See Table 4 for a high-level breakdown of the major federal agencies that received 
funding in the aftermath of the Northridge earthquake (Quake 29). 
 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) USD 0.837 billion 
Department of Interior—historic preservation work  USD 0.005 billion 
Department of Education  USD 255.6 million 
Federal costs unaccounted for  USD 0.864 billion. 
TOTAL  USD 1.098 billion 
 
Table 4.   Northridge earthquake, major federal funding by department  
(from FEMA website) 
G. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE AND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
The Northridge earthquake presented various challenges that needed to be 
addressed as soon as possible in an effort to restore the Los Angeles area back to its 
original state and functionality. In regard to transportation, there were numerous closures 
and downed throughways. For instance, all lanes were completely shut down for a 
significant portion of the Interstate 5 Freeway. In the first few days after the earthquake 
occurred, only the trucks-only lanes were undamaged on Interstate 5. State Route 14 
lanes were closed. Additionally, all Interstate 10 lanes were closed for several miles. In 
an effort to respond to these significant roadway closures, demolition, and debris 
removal, drivers were directed through local streets as detours. However, this drastically 
altered the traffic patterns and times of arrival of commuters around the city. 
Debris removal was a significant issue during the Northridge earthquake recovery 
(Figure 6) and one of the major problems identified by the city of Los Angeles is that it 
did not have a contingency plan for debris management prior to the earthquake. 
Immediately following the earthquake, the city quickly developed a debris management 
program. A curbside debris collection program was instituted to start the cleanup process. 
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Debris collection was mixed with trash, construction material, and organic material in 
pick up containers. Construction and demolition debris on normal collection days prior to 
the earthquake made up to 15 percent of the city collected waste (Quake, 4). Prior to the 
earthquake, construction and demolition waste comprised of 150 tons of waste per day. 
Following the earthquake, the city collected as much as 10,000 tons of construction and 
demolition waste on a daily basis (Quake, 4).  
 
Figure 6.  Debris removal of destroyed California freeways was a massive 
undertaking (from Mehmet and Brown 95) 
Before the earthquake city contracts for debris removal were mere two pages long 
and contracted for one week of work. The initial contracts allowed the city to begin 
removing debris quickly, but it did not include a recycling clause or other requirements 
such as separating like materials in different container for easy haul away. After the 
earthquake, the contracts grew to 22 pages. The city reduced the logistical foot print by 
assigning each contractor a certain block or set of streets to clear.  
After two months of negotiating with City of Los Angeles, FEMA allowed the 
city to incorporate recycling as a debris removal method. The city and FEMA based their 
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decision on the city’s local policy to support recycling and it documented a pilot program 
that stated a potential 82 percent recycling rate. The city issued contracts that required 
contractors to separate collections of wood, metal, dirt, concrete and asphalt, and red clay 
brick. Any debris that could not be separated at the site of collection was sent to facilities 
that separated the debris allowing them to recycle at least 80 percent of the mixed debris. 
The City of Los Angeles was largely self-sufficient in collecting, separating, recycling, 
and managing its earthquake debris. The city took its debris collection process a step 
further by setting up an agreement between the city and FEMA to allow the city to obtain 
assistance from United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the State of 
California, and other states should the need arise.  
This inconvenience and challenge influenced other challenges in the city. For 
instance, on the ninth day after the earthquake, Metrolink ridership increased 
22,000 boardings per day along the new extension of the Santa Clarita rail line serving 
areas surrounding earthquake-damaged roads. This presented a challenge because the 
average boardings per day prior to the earthquake were estimated at 1,000. Therefore, the 
transportation agencies had to prepare for a drastic influx in public transportation 
accommodations for 21,000 new passengers.  
Despite the volume of challenges the region experienced as a result of the 
Northridge earthquake, many successes also occurred. For example, the FEMA Special 
Facility Teleregistration Center was activated. By the fifth day after the earthquake, the 
initial contracts written to clear debris and repair Interstate 10 northbound and 
southbound connectors to Interstate 405 were completed allowing them to reopen. By the 
twelfth day, the southbound State Route 14 to southbound Interstate 5 truck bypass 
opened with one High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane and one mixed flow lane, which 
alleviated some of the most significant traffic delays experienced in the first week of the 
earthquake response. At the end of January 1994, lane capacity in the damaged roadway 
corridors is restored to 70 percent of the level existing prior to the Northridge earthquake 
(DeBlasio et al. 15). 
In the beginning of February 1994, a regular system of detours and emergency 
express bus services were in operation. Another success experienced after the Northridge 
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earthquake was that construction on Interstate 10, Santa Monica Freeway, was started, 
less than a month after the earthquake. Shortly after construction on Interstate 10 began, 
construction on Camarillo Metrolink began as well. A number of previously downed 
roadways were restored and reopened after only two months, including the westbound 
State Route 118 and Interstate 5, Golden State Freeway at Gavin Canyon. 
However, the greatest successes are evident in that the organization and 
leadership throughout the rescue and rebuilding phases of the Northridge earthquake 
aftermath were able to generate improvements ahead of schedule, demonstrating the 
commitment to rebound effectively from the disaster. For example, the Interstate 10 
Santa Monica Freeway opened 74 days ahead of schedule. The Interstate 5/State Route 
14 Interchange reopened three weeks ahead of schedule. The State Route 118 Simi 
Valley Freeway westbound lanes opened more than two weeks ahead of schedule.  
Only two roadways were altered until the end of 1994, including the eastbound  
State Route 118 lanes and the remaining two ramps at the State Route 14/Interstate 5 
Interchange; however, all roads were restored by the end of the year, only 11 months 
after the Northridge earthquake occurred.  
H. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
After assessing the damage of the Northridge earthquake, changes were needed to 
ensure the safety and effectiveness of first responders and rescue teams. For instance, 
confined space rescues required the need for rescuers to understand the possibility of an 
explosion occurring. To respond to these fears, vapor suppression and positive pressure 
ventilation had to be maintained. Additionally, prior to allowing rescue teams to enter 
vulnerable situations, safe zones and evacuation routes were outlined in the event that a 
secondary collapse occurred while rescue teams were present. This marked circumstance-
based confined space rescue strategies that would allow teams to assist the injured while 
preventing further injury.  
Several other changes were made to reflect contemporary circumstances and to 
promote the safety of the response teams. For instance, rather than using firefighting 
helmets, rescue teams during the Northridge earthquake rescue wore construction-style 
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helmets. The Northridge earthquake allowed rescue teams to find that wearing jumpsuits 
was more effective in the confined space situations than turnout gear. The rescue teams 
practiced methodical lifting and cribbing efforts to ensure the safety of the scene as well 
as obtain insight into the effects of the earthquake on various structures. Rescue 
personnel was continually assessed and evaluated to ensure their well-being and 
effectiveness. Coordination efforts were orchestrated by using color-coordinated hose 
lines. 
The City of Los Angeles instituted a city wide plan for debris management. A 
curbside debris collection program was introduced that required contractors to include 
recycling or a separation method. Debris collection was separated in to trash, construction 
material, and organic materials for pick up at curb side. Contracts included a recycling 
clause or other requirements such as separating like materials in different container for 
easy haul away.  
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
When any natural disaster occurs, contingency planning plays an essential role in 
both preparedness and response. Considering California is a location that is prone to 
experiencing earthquakes, the contingency planning efforts in place at the time of the 
event were quite effective. For example, a mere 15 hours after the earthquake occurred, 
the first contracts were initiated, prompting the beginning of lengthy efforts to remove 
debris and employ demolition efforts. Among the many contracts that were created for 
the response was California Transportation (Caltrans). Once the Caltrans completed its 
analysis of the damage of major transportation systems as a result of the Northridge 
earthquake, good-faith agreements were made to begin rebuilding highway networks 
immediately (DeBlasio et al. 10). The purposes of these agreements were to summarize 
and document recycling and debris removal efforts, requirements for debris removal, and 
relocation standards for removing debris as well as recycling matter that was affected by 
the Northridge earthquake.  
Additionally, a significant good faith contract was set in place to address traffic 
management and reengineering. In the good faith contact that was developed with the 
 34
Caltrans engineers, a Traffic Management Plan (TMP) was created. Within this TMP, 
efforts to coordinate traffic operations for the entire Los Angeles region were addressed. 
All three aspects of government-based disaster recovery—federal, state, and 
local—were employed to respond to the Northridge earthquake in 1994. Additionally, 
industry leaders and local organizations applied hands-on support in the earliest phases of 
recovery. A total of $1.098 billion were allocated in the wake of the Northridge quake. 
This includes $.837 billion, $.005 billion, $255.6 million, and $.864 billion dedicated to 
the Department of Housing and Development, the Department of Interior, the Department 
of Education, and unaccounted for funds, respectively.  
In conclusion, the organizational structure and leadership that existed once the 
Northridge earthquake occurred was generally effective. The Northridge earthquake 
presented a need for an effective incident management model. In conjunction with 
leadership and organization from FEMA, the Incident Command System (ICS), which is 
a standardized hazards incident management approach, an all-risk system was developed 
to address the specific needs of the Northridge earthquake damage (FEMA). The lessons 
learned from this earthquake, and both the positive and negative planning strategies 
executed, provide a foundation for better preparedness in the future.  
Despite the effectiveness of the response and contingency contracting related to 
the Northridge earthquake, one of the significant criticisms about this event was the 
absence contingency plan for debris management prior to the earthquake. This is 
important for future contingency planning because future plans and response efforts are 
based off of predictable outcomes of previous earthquakes. When evaluating the response 
and contingency planning that occurred after the Northridge earthquake, future efforts 
can be based on both the successes and failures; successes should be emulated, and 
failures should be amended for future events. Thus, it is evident that not only the State of 
California, but also federal disaster response agencies should consider the lessons learned 
from the 1994 incident and develop strategies to combat worse situations that possibly 
could occur at any time. 
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IV. HURRICANE KATRINA (2004) 
No hurricane in recent history evokes more emotion and dread than Hurricane 
Katrina. Katrina struck the continental United States on August 23, 2005 and was the 
deadliest hurricane in the United States since 1928 with 1,833 deaths and thousands of 
injuries. Katrina was also the costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States, 
causing over $81 billion of damage—more than triple the amount of the infamous 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Katrina began life as Tropical Depression Twelve on  
August 23, 2005 in the vicinity of the Bahamas and began moving westward toward 
Florida, reaching Category 1 status just prior to landfall around Hallandale Beach, FL. 
Damage in southern Florida was minor but as the storm crossed into the Gulf of Mexico, 
it rapidly gained in strength and size due to the warm waters of the Gulf. After reaching 
Category 3 status, the storm took only nine more hours to reach Category 5, the highest 
level on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. 
Crossing the Gulf of Mexico, the storm turned northward and targeted the 
Louisiana/Mississippi border area for landfall, fortunately decreasing in strength to 
Category 3 just prior to making landfall (Figure 7). Despite the warnings from state and 
federal governmental agencies, most residents did not evacuate the low-lying coastal 
areas and within hours these areas were flooded for miles inland. However, the worst was 
yet to come and as the storm assaulted the New Orleans area, the levee system built to 
hold back flood waters from areas at or below sea level rapidly began to breach and fail. 
What resulted was later determined to be the worst civil engineering disaster in the 
history of the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), who were the designers and builders 




Figure 7.  Hurricane Katrina making landfall (from NOAA website) 
As illustrated in Figures 7 and 8, Katrina maintained Category 3 strength until 
over 150 miles inland and around Meridian, Mississippi, was finally downgraded to a 
tropical storm and then a tropical depression near Clarksville, TN. The storm eventually 
dissipated in the Great Lakes region on August 31 and remnants continued to affect areas 
of Canada for several days afterward.  
As Katrina moved on, the extent of damage and flooding quickly became known 
to the world. The coastal areas within several hundred miles on either side of the eye of 
the storm were devastated with boats found miles inland from the incredible storm surge. 
The breaching of the levees in New Orleans was without a doubt the most catastrophic 
event of the storm and one that will be etched in the memories of Americans for many 
years to come. Those that witnessed the devastating hurricane and the flooding that 
quickly followed described New Orleans as “a ghastly Atlantis where people huddled on 
rooftops and bodies floated in the streets, as neighborhood after neighborhood succumbed 
to a relentless, creeping flood” (Block and Cooper 3). As New Orleans flooded, over 
30,000 residents sought refuge in the Superdome, the home of the New Orleans Saints. 
The facility lacked adequate sanitation facilities for any type of extended stay and after 
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several days, was in abysmal condition and was health hazard that took years to fully 
repair. 
 
Figure 8.  Hurricane Karina at full strength, just prior to  
landfall in LA (from Ferrell 3) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Some would call Hurricane Katrina the perfect storm; it was not. Instead, it was 
actually the failure and destruction of New Orleans’ levee system actually caused the 
most tremendous damage to the city. Due to mismanagement and poor state of its levee 
systems, corrupt politics that endured for years in the state of Louisiana, lack of 
preparation for the hurricanes and the lack of a plan on what to do when a “perfect” storm 
did in fact hit the area.  
In 2004, the state of Louisiana received funding and permission to begin 
developing plans for the natural disaster scenarios on the national scenario list. Hurricane 
Pam was developed and selected as the Emergency Responder’s test subject because the 
greater New Orleans area faces a triple threat when it comes to sources of flood risk: the 
Mississippi River, rain, and hurricane storm surge. Hurricane Pam was the name given to 
the exercise conducted a year prior to Katrina. Pam was designed to get local and federal 
disaster responders thinking about how they might deal with the aftereffects of a 
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catastrophic storm that hit New Orleans. It utilized computer modeling simulating a 
category 5 “perfect storm” that supposedly hit New Orleans, ironically taking the actual 
path of Katrina. The discussions that ensued and plans that were discussed during the 
Hurricane Pam exercise never garnered the attention of state and city officials. 
Regrettably, the lessons learned from the simulation were filed away instead of studied 
and acted upon. The aftermath of Katrina and the subsequent failed levees could have 
been avoided with some pre-placed funding and training for the emergency response 
teams.  
In an effort to stave off catastrophic destruction from hurricanes, the federal 
government has ‘dumped’ hurricane plans on the state over the years, and they are all 
hundreds of pages long, thick with appendixes and crammed with dense, jargon-filled 
prose. Most of them were created by government staffers in Washington; a few were 
created without any local input at all. Most sit unread in disaster offices throughout 
southern Louisiana (Block and Cooper 3). 
Unfortunately, the common practice among governmental bodies in Louisiana 
was to accept such studies without comment, agree to adopt them by unanimous vote, and 
store them on a shelf, along with the budget books and other publications created by local 
bureaucracy (Block and Cooper 3). 
Ultimately, there are three state entities that have responsibility for the levees of 
New Orleans: The Sewerage & Water Board which runs the program, the Army Corps of 
Engineers which builds the levees, and the Levee Board which is responsible for levee 
maintenance, mowing the grass and painting the walls and making sure nothing leaks 
(Block and Cooper 4). 
For the first 120 years of its existence, the Army Corps of Engineers had a 
standing mission: to expand and bring rigor to the nation’s navigation system. But 
beginning in the late 1920s, the Corps took on the additional role of overseeing flood 
control projects and protecting communities from disaster. Though its payroll was large, 
the Levee District was basically reduced to a landscaping operation, responsible for 
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mowing the grass on the levees and reporting any problems to the Army Corps of 
Engineers (Block and Cooper 7).  
 The state continuously requested funding for the legitimate purpose of 
maintaining the shipping lanes of the Mississippi River and to keep the occupants of New 
Orleans safe. “In the past, there’s no question Louisiana got more federal money per 
capita than any other state in the union except Alaska,” said Tommy Boggs, the son of 
Hale and former congresswoman Lindy Boggs and a powerful Washington lobbyist 
himself (Block and Cooper 7). The problem was that the money that was sent to 
Louisiana did not always get used for its intended purpose. It is alleged that the 
delegation of the state held tremendous sway over the purse strings on Capitol Hill, 
primarily through the ministrations of senior members such as Senators Russell Long,  
J. Bennett Johnston, and John Breaux, along with House members such as the late 
majority leader Hale Boggs, the former Appropriations Committee chairman Bob 
Livingston, and Billy Tauzin, who served as chairman of the Commerce Committee. 
These politicians dominated the process of bringing home water pork and were 
responsible for grabbing outsized amounts of money for the state, such as the  
$410 million they snagged for the corps’ Orleans District in 1999. Yet no notable 
improvements were made to the levee system nor were there contracts pre-positioned in 
case of emergency.  
The city of New Orleans has an inherent vulnerability to flooding. The city was 
built on a swamp and is below sea level. In addition, “the city’s drainage system was 
designed exactly backward” (Block and Cooper 12). In order to keep the city from being 
flooded daily, the pumps within the levee system suck runoff out of the city and push it 
north. Unfortunately, in New Orleans, north is downhill and all three of these canals used 
to funnel water away from the city are buttressed by floodwalls, massive piles of earth, 
sheet piling, and reinforced concrete that look like just about the strongest structures 
known to man (Block and Cooper 12).  
When a Gulf hurricane approaches, the possibility arises that the system might 
reverse itself: the outfall canals would become intake canals and instead of storm water 
moving out of neighborhoods and into the lake, a storm surge might enter the narrow race 
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and blast through the middle of the city. Even a “mild” hurricane could send a storm 
surge gushing over the canal floodwalls. If that were to occur, the pumps at the end of the 
three canals would not be able to overpower a rushing tidal current. 
From the mid-1960s through the early 1990s, the Army Corps suggested that the 
three canals be outfitted with swinging floodgates that could be shut in the face of a 
hurricane threat. But in the end, through a combination of sheer stubbornness and sly 
politics, the Sewerage & Water Board prevailed with its policy of building ever more 
expensive and elaborate floodwalls to keep the canals at bay instead of building 
floodgates as the Army Corps of Engineers suggested (Block and Cooper 25). 
Despite thirty years of work and $650 million in contracts, the city’s hurricane 
protection system was still not complete in 2005, and it had been ten years since 
engineers had done any serious work on the network of canals. To make matters worse 
much of the city’s vaunted levee system, mandated by Congress to provide no more than 
Category 3 hurricane protection, remained untested (Block and Cooper 25). 
Ultimately, the requisite information had been gathered, funding had been 
received, and some were willing to work in order to prepare for a large destructive storm, 
but instead, state and local officials did virtually nothing to prepare for a major storm.  
B. THE HURRICANE AND PREPARATIONS 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast of the United States on August 
29, 2005. When the hurricane finally reached the coast, it had grown into a Category 3 
hurricane according to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale and was approximately 
200 miles wide and is illustrated in Figure 9. More specifically, the hurricane 
demonstrated winds at approximately 100 to 140 miles per hour. Once Hurricane Katrina 
breached the New Orleans, Louisiana area, rain already had been falling for several 
hours. The city was given ample time to evacuate prior to the storm surge. The city was 
described “as a ghastly Atlantis where people huddled on rooftops and bodies floated in 
the streets, as neighborhood after neighborhood succumbed to a relentless, creeping flood 
(Block and Cooper 6). 
 41
 
Figure 9.  NOAA radar picture of Katrina at Category 3 strength  
(from NOAA website) 
However, many residents did not evacuate because there was not an evacuation 
plan that would accommodate all residents regardless of their socioeconomic or disability 
status. For instance, impoverished and elderly people found it difficult to evacuate and 
were left with no choice but to remain behind in New Orleans. When the storm hit, many 
people sought refuge on their rooftops or attics. The storm surged as high as nine meters 
in certain locations. Thus, the levees and drainage canals could not sustain waters, 
resulting in at least 80 percent of the city being underwater at some point once Hurricane 
Katrina surfaced.  
Not only was the event disastrous, but also in terms of contingency contracting as 
well as immediate and long-term response, Hurricane Katrina proved devastating. 
Although the hurricane was a natural disaster that could not be planned for in its entirety, 
the preemptive measures on behalf of government and response teams as well as the 
response endeavors lacked effectiveness, leading to consequences not previously seen 
with any disaster in the United States. In fact, levee breaches, as illustrated in Figure 10, 
led to massive flooding, and many people charged that the federal government was slow 
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to meet the needs of the people affected by the storm. Damage affected hundreds of 
thousands of individuals in the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. In many 
cases, people lost their homes and belongings and were forced to relocate away from the 
Gulf Coast. Additionally, the monetary estimate of damages regarding Hurricane Katrina, 
according to the U.S. government, stands at around $100 billion.  
In addition to leaving at least five million people without power for an extended 
period of time, many individuals did not survive Hurricane Katrina. At least 1,200 people 
died during the event. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Andrew had been one of the 
most catastrophic events to hit the United States; however, Hurricane Katrina has proven 
to be one of the most expensive natural disaster in the nation, ultimately due to lack of 
preparation for the storm.  
Fortunately, some of the immediate response efforts were provided through pre-
existing contracts that had been previously awarded through full and open competition. 
“Nevertheless, concerns were raised with respect to how FEMA awarded contracts in 
Katrina’s immediate aftermath and regarding what contract vehicles were in place before 
landfall…(regrettably) FEMA was not reporting or tracking procurements undertaken by 
disaster field office, and the procurement office remains to this day understaffed given 
the volume and dollar value of its work” (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina) 
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Figure 10.   New Orleans levee breaches (Bird of Paradise 5) 
C. RESPONSE 
Once aware of imminent danger, President Bush took “… the initiative to 
personally call Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation” and “took the unusual 
step of declaring an emergency in the Gulf States prior to Katrina making landfall” 
(Senate Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs, 21). It was 
obvious that the federal government took the weather service’s warnings seriously. “The 
National Weather Service provided repeated and accurate warnings, but local populations 
did not fully evacuate—greatly magnifying human suffering in the wake of the storm. 
Andrew and Katrina both overwhelmed State and local responders, but the federal 
response to Katrina was greatly improved due to better preparations prior to landfall” 
(Bush). 
Prior to Katrina’s arrival FEMA “positioned an unprecedented number of 
resources in affected areas prior to Katrina’s landfall, to include 18 disaster medical 
teams, medical supplies and equipment, and nine urban search and rescue task forces,” 
and by September 1st (only 72 hours after landfall) had deployed nearly 1,800 personnel 
to save lives and render medical assistance” (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 5). The federal government issued 
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disaster declarations blanketing 90,000 square miles of the U.S. In terms of immediate 
response, local, state, and federal response was needed.  
Fortunately, many Gulf Coast residents that were able evacuated the area prior to 
Katrina’s arrival, even though they had no planned destination; “An exodus of hundreds 
of thousands left the city, many becoming refugees, finding shelter with nearby relatives 
or restarting their lives in states as far away as Massachusetts and Utah” (Laforet). Due to 
early planning, many residents were spared the horror of the aftermath of Katrina and  
the subsequent flooding of the Gulf region and therefore praised the President for his 
early planning. Surprisingly, instead of denouncing President Bush and blaming him for 
their plight, they praised The President and blamed local officials for the city’s demise 
(Baker 3). 
Some of the work performed by FEMA was critical to the survival of the Gulf 
Coast residents. “FEMA staff distributed more than $5 billion in federal aid to more than 
1.7 million households in the affected region by February 1, 2006. FEMA also mobilized 
elements of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), such as Disaster Medical 
Assistance Teams (DMATs), deploying them to the Gulf States to assist with emergency 
health care delivery. …DMAT treated more than 3,000 patients that were able to make it 
to the medical center, and treated another 2,000 by sending teams of their own personnel 
out into the surrounding area” (Bush). Since DMAT is a group of professionals supported 
by their own logistics and admin staff designed to be a rapid response element to 
supplement local medical care for a period of 72 hours, they were able to provide medical 
care during the disaster without much intervention or guidance by FEMA or other federal 
entities (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response) 
Forty-one of Louisiana’s 64 parishes suffered serious damage and FEMA 
provided $4 billion directly to Katrina victims for financial and housing assistance 
through its Individual and Housing Program, not to mention $3.1 billion in housing 
assistance to victims of Katrina and Rita. With over 30,000 people rescued immediately 
following the hurricane, it can be surprising to hear claims that the federal response was 
not as proactive as some hoped. Statements like the ones reported in 2006 interview with 
House Republicans proved the displeasure of even those within the federal government. 
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They suggested that “the federal government’s “blinding lack of situational awareness 
and disjointed decision making needlessly compounded and prolonged Katrina’s horror” 
(Frick). 
Within hours of Katrina reaching landfall, the DHS’s Chief Procurement Officer 
asked the DHS Inspector General’s (IG) Office to begin overseeing the acquisition 
process in an effort to reduce the number of future contact disputes with vendors working 
on Katrina relief with the government. The DHS IG assigned 60 auditors, investigators, 
and inspectors and planned to hire thirty additional oversight personnel. The goal was to 
have the IG’s staff to review the award and administration of all major contracts, 
including those awardee in the initial efforts and monitor all contracting activities as the 
government developed its requirements and as the selection and award process continued.  
On August 19th 2005, “the Secretary of Defense approved a standing order to 
prepare and organize for severe weather disaster operations. This order expedited the pre-
positioning of senior military representatives known as Defense Coordinating Officers, to 
act as liaisons with other governmental organizations in the projected disaster area prior 
to an event.” The order allowed state and federal entities to utilize DOD installations as 
logistical staging areas for FEMA. The DOD provided logistics support to FEMA, 
helping the Agency to track logistics assets while in transit (Bush). 
There were other notable contributions by federal entities that should be praised 
and recognized: 
 The DOD and National Guard specifically assisted with search and rescue 
efforts, and in addition assisted with the evacuation of Gulf Coast citizens 
following the flooding.  
 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention deployed approximately 
200 people to the Gulf Coast to assist with medical treatment for the 
displaced.  
 The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, provided reports on the 
infrastructure within the area, to include airports, hospitals, police stations, 
emergency operations centers, highways, and schools. They provided the 
first comprehensive overview of the damage from Katrina. They addressed 
recovery planning and operations, transportation infrastructure, critical 
and catastrophic damage, dike stability and breaches, industry damage, 
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and hazard spills. The imagery activities of NGA were essential to the 
restoration of critical infrastructure. 
 The Department of Transportation (DOT) successfully coordinated one of 
the largest airlifts in its history to support the emergency evacuation of 
more than 66,000 citizens from New Orleans. The Air Transport 
Association also coordinated forty domestic flights with continual DOD 
and civilian flights to evacuate a total of 24,000 people.  
 Prior to Katrina making landfall, the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) 
had proactively pre-positioned food in warehouses in Louisiana and 
Texas, making the food readily available for disaster meal service 
programs. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) sent 
fifty veterinarians and wildlife experts to the region to rescue animals—
pets, zoo animals, and livestock. They augmented and provided veterinary 
services in Louisiana and Mississippi, saving more than 10,000 animals 
from the flooding of New Orleans. APHIS helped many animals survive 
until they could be reunited with their owners, reduce the economic impact 
of further agricultural losses, and maintain research continuity. 
In addition to the federal assistance offered, less publicized assistance came from 
states that were not affected by the super storm. Other states within the union provided 
invaluable assistance to Gulf Coast States that would have otherwise declined into 
complete and utter lawlessness chaos. For instance, The Fire Department of New York 
City (FDNY) and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) deployed staff and 
equipment to assist in the recovery effort. “FDNY sent over 660 fire department staff 
…to assist the crippled New Orleans Fire Department. NYPD sent more than 300 officers 
to support the effort to restore order.” Additionally, the State of New York sent more than 
100 officers and the Department of Corrections sent more than 250 officers in an effort to 
help the Gulf States regain control of their respective cities. New York City’s Urban 
Search and Rescue Team, which is made up of NYPD, FDNY, and Office of Emergency 
Management personnel, was deployed to Mississippi at FEMA’s request to support 
rescue efforts along the Gulf Coast. “Fire trucks, police cruisers, school buses, transit 
buses, and other equipment and goods, bearing the seal of the State or City of New York 
were abundant during the response” (Bush).  
Perhaps most important to the recovery effort, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
“led the removal of 224 billion gallons of water from New Orleans in 43 days, enabling 
recovery and repair operations. By improving their pumping capacity and efficiency, 
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adding pumps, creating intentional breaches, and developing other on-the-spot 
workarounds, they were able to reduce the estimated time to clear New Orleans of water 
by approximately 50 percent” (Bush). 
In an interview with Ali Frick, President Bush stated that “…things [could] have 
been done better” but denied any problem with the federal response to the disaster, 
insisting… “Don’t tell me the federal response was slow!” (Frick).  
D. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
Within four days of Katrina’s landfall on Monday, Aug. 29, 2005, then-President 
George W. Bush signed a $10.4 billion aid package and ordered 7,200 National Guard 
troops to the region. A few days later, he requested—and Congress approved—an 
additional $51.8 billion in aid, yet most of the funding seemed to vanish into thin air 
(Robillard). Even with all of the aid provided by individuals, states, and the federal 
government, the response to Hurricane Katrina failed due to a lack of command structure 
for the overall response effort, a lack of pre-negotiated contracting efforts, and a lack of 
training for contracting officers and contracting officer’s representatives. While training 
simulations like the Hurricane Pam Exercise were conducted, the lessons learned during 
the exercise were incomplete and ultimately ignored by those that should have used the 
exercise for information and insight as to what could have been pre-positioned prior to an 
actual disaster. Individuals that should have been involved in the simulation were not 
required to participate, nor were lessons learned shared with neighboring states or DOD. 
Such failures resulted in New Orleans residents being effectively stranded by the 
government, as illustrated in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Stranded citizens of New Orleans at the Superdome (from AFP website) 
Before Katrina struck, FEMA had only one contract in place relevant to the 
Katrina response for temporary housing. According to former FEMA director Mike 
Brown, ‘the agency in some cases had to buy goods and services “off the street” to meet 
demand because of inadequate pre-established contracts.” The most tragic consequence 
of inadequate pre-established contingency contracts involved the removal of deceased 
victims from the devastated areas. Squabbling between the state and federal governments 
prevented recovery of the deceased. “Federal officials maintained that body recovery was 
ultimately a state responsibility with the federal government providing support only. 
After much finger-pointing between FEMA and Louisiana officials, on September 13, 
2005, Governor Blanco directed the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals to 
sign a written contract to retrieve and transport the bodies of the deceased” (Amey). 
Disappointingly, in instances when the government was in a position to use pre-
negotiated contracts, it failed to do so! GSA Schedules offer government buyers goods 
and services at pre-negotiated rates from approved vendors. “…one company on the GSA 
Schedule (was pre-contracted) to lease cars, SUVs, and light trucks could have provided 
FEMA with vehicles for under $600/month, FEMA instead paid Enterprise Rent-A-Car 
to lease 18 vehicles at the annual price of $11,232 a vehicle ($936/month)” (Amey). 
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It has been concluded that no contingency plan existed in regard to policing or 
crowd control. Therefore, there was no order after the Hurricane had passed. Many local 
police officers were preoccupied with their own families and welfare, and others 
attempted to help their own families as well as citizens simultaneously. In some cases, the 
stress and mismanagement weighed heavily on local police forces, and many officers 
took their own lives out of desperation (Block and Cooper 156). 
Ultimately, “the lack of planning and pre-landfall contracts caused federal 
agencies to hustle to locate vendors, to shy away from aggressive negotiations, to enter 
into no-bid contracts, to use inappropriate contract types, and to pay higher prices in an 
effort to buy goods and services quickly. In other words, the victims and the taxpayers 
were not protected by normal market forces that prevent bad deals, and control waste, 
fraud, and abuse in government spending” (Amey).  
The only agency that appears to have prepared and created contingency contracts 
was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. They “…pre-awarded competitively bid contracts 
for all of these functions to allow quick deployment of resources prior to and immediately 
after an event. These pre-awarded contracts are part of USACE’s Advanced Contracting 
Initiative (ACI), which has been in place for about six years” (Amey). The GAO’s 2004 
report on contingency planning found that few contingency documents adequately 
described federal agencies’ delegations of authority. In some cases, inadequate planning -
—especially for temporary housing—led to hundreds of millions of dollars of waste in 
recovery efforts.  
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the importance of contingency contracting as an 
effort to mitigate natural or societal disasters. As the recovery effort continued in New 
Orleans, changes were already being made to the way in which the federal government 
responded to disaster. Unfortunately, due to lack of pre-planning, contracting officers on-
site were forced to learn contingency contracting process, as outlined in Figure 6, while 
in the field meeting immediate needs of the Louisiana residents. In addition to better 
outlining command and control, communications and preparation, contracting took center 
stage. It was demonstrated time and again during Katrina that civilian companies were 
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better equipped to handle short-fused needs and that they had learned their lessons four 
years prior during 9–11.  
E. FUNDING 
As summarized by Scott H Amey in his online article Federal Contracting: 
Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina: 
to prevent abuse, the government should enter into pre-established 
contingency contracts, and ensure that certain contract types that have a 
greater propensity for abuse (including performance-based contracts, 
interagency contracts, time and material contracts, and purchase card 
transactions) are used only in limited circumstances and are accompanied 
by audit and oversight controls. (20)  
Once the nation had time to reflect and study the response to Hurricane Katrina, it 
was evident that the government was not prepared to handle disasters of such magnitude. 
A Category 5 hurricane combined with breeched levees had been predicted during the 
Pam exercise, but seemed too far-fetched for anyone to really believe the situation to be 
plausible. Unfortunately for Gulf Coast residents, the impossible became reality and they 
were left to suffer in the aftermath. “Chief among the issues raised were the dearth of 
advance (or pre-existing) contracts; the federal government’s use of noncompetitive 
contracts; the proliferation of subcontracting tiers to five or six levels; and the concern 
that, despite a Stafford Act requirement that a preference be given to local firms for 
disaster recovery activities following an emergency or disaster, local companies were 
largely overlooked in Hurricane Katrina contracting. Legislation enacted by the 109th 
Congress addressed these procurement issues” (Bea et al. 56). The lack of pre-placed 
contracts led to supplemental funding requirements, as illustrated in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.   Hurricane Katrina, supplemental appropriations (from Long 7) 
The Federal Stafford Act served as a disaster assistance funding alternative for 
Hurricane Katrina’s damages. The Stafford Act fulfills a number of purposes. The 
funding from the act is dedicated to preparedness, emergency response, recovery, and 
hazard mitigation. Regrettably, it has been reported that the federal government did not 
waive the Stafford Act, which requires localities to contribute 10 percent of the cost of 
reconstruction and clean-up projects, until May 2006. Laws enacted by the 109th 
Congress amend the Stafford Act by clarifying some sections, waiving some previous 
requirements, and creation of new authorities. The changes to the act reflect lessons 
learned after Hurricane Katrina and the belief of a need for legal remedies to make 
Stafford Act programs more flexible and responsive to events of a catastrophic nature. 
Another channel of funding came from FEMA, which purchased over 25,000 
transitional homes and 27,000 travel trailers for over $900 million (Block and Cooper 
133). However, this funding was also unsustainable. Block and Cooper suggest that 
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FEMA should have developed a contract mechanism defining the responsibilities of each 
role as well as the deliverables and expectations for contractors. Because it did not do 
that, FEMA’s decisions led to wasting valuable funding.  
 
Figure 13.   Small versus big business contracts (from The Associated Press) 
F. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE AND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
A deficit in communication proved to be most detrimental to first-response efforts 
of Hurricane Katrina. Because effective communication was absent, response and 
recovery efforts could not occur as previously planned. As a result of local, state, and 
federal first responders not being able to communicate with one another as well as the 
public effectively, there were extended delays in coordinating organizations for relief as 
well as offering provisions and refuge for individuals severely impacted by the 
catastrophic storm. According to Cooper and Block, “Long delays in response can be 
directly attributed to the inability of officials to communicate with one another as well as 
those officials above them who were in positions to help” (247). Communication was 
disabled in New Orleans from August 28, 2005 to August 31, 2005—approximately four 
days after the disaster occurred. Once the phone systems had been corrupted or 
compromised, there was no alternative communication method for first responders to 
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reach second responders. It was not until one first responder was able to access his 
personal Internet phone account and could reach outside of the city for the first time after 
four days. Following Katrina, command and control plans served to outline several 
important aspects of response, including chains of command, the roles of each 
commander, backup commanders in the event that first line of command cannot fulfill 
their roles, and the limitations to their roles. 
Once communication was restored, a component of first response was the 
community itself. Ordinary citizens commandeered boats and offered food and shelter 
until second-level response teams could reach the city. However, it has been stated that 
first response did not fulfill its role effectively, which means that second wave of 
responders fulfilled the role of first response, only much too late.  
As communication became fluid between the city and federal response teams, the 
nation acted heroically to help individuals impacted by Hurricane Katrina as well as the 
City of New Orleans and surrounding Gulf Coast areas. Help was offered not only by 
other cities and states, but other nations that had experience dealing with such 
catastrophic events.  
Although many individuals and organizations rose to the challenge of providing 
help for victims of Hurricane Katrina as well as the City of New Orleans, the federal 
government demonstrated that it was not prepared to handle a disaster at the magnitude of 
Hurricane Katrina. The failure illustrates that contingency planning was not adequate on 
the federal level as well as on the local and state levels. For instance, days had passed 
since the hurricane hit when FEMA was able to establish operations in New Orleans. 
Even after FEMA had arrived, no unified plan of action had been created or was ready 
for execution until over a week later. Due to a lack of pre-planning, recovery took longer 
and cost more than it should have. 
The role of FEMA as a major disaster response organization in the United States 
is to ensure that disaster mitigation programs are developed and plans for disasters are 
coordinated. However, the acting capacity of FEMA in this disaster was overreached 
because of the lack of response and organization from other local, state, and federal 
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response teams. As a result, FEMA was unable to perform as expected. Even as FEMA 
representatives in New Orleans plead for more resources from FEMA representatives in 
the capitol, the agency was having a hard time predicting when supplies would arrive and 
where they were in transit (Block and Cooper 124).  
Albeit not an all-inclusive list, other findings of failure are listed below: 
 1. Due to a lack of communication between personnel within FEMA, 
FEMA’s operations leader in Louisiana was apparently unaware of his 
own agency’s assessment that the area was too flooded for the Mobile 
Emergency Response Support (MERS) communications trucks to get to 
the Superdome! (Block and Cooper 141). Not only was there no 
communication between state representatives and FEMA, those 
representing FEMA in DC and Louisiana could not agree on how to 
resolve the problems faced by survivors of Katrina. Once FEMA appeared 
to try to gain control of the situation, they quickly gained a reputation as 
“a stovepipe into which intelligence disappeared and rarely 
reemerged”(Block and Cooper). It was later discovered that not only did 
the local FEMA representatives fail to share information with local 
authorities; they failed to provide information back to their superiors in 
Washington, DC thereby preventing the President from obtaining the 
much-needed information to make quick responsible decisions.  
 2. In Baton Rouge late Tuesday afternoon, Louisiana’s Jeff Smith, who 
had earlier been told that 500 buses were coming, received the paperwork 
that would formalize the request. As he looked over the documents, he 
saw that the number of requested buses had dropped to 455. “I was told 
that someone at FEMA headquarters had ‘done the math’ and it was 
determined that we didn’t need 500 buses” (Block and Cooper 143). And 
again later, when buses were ordered by FEMA to evacuate people from 
the Superdome and other areas of the disaster, the original request was not 
honored, but changed based upon someone’s uninformed opinion. The 
long-awaited contracts, based on requests the state had made several days 
before, were starting to kick in. The U.S. Department of Transportation 
had finally delivered a full complement of 1,100 buses, and many 
hundreds were already lined up in city streets. In addition, Transportation 
had also begun moving the first commercial aircraft into the New Orleans 
airport, to whisk evacuees out of the ruined city (Block and Cooper 143). 
Ultimately, those that were on site were not being trusted or empowered to 
do their jobs nor were they effectively communicating with those in DC. 
Due to a misconceived belief that FEMA was attempting to relieve state 
and local authorities of their power, those in state government made 
FEMA’s job more difficult. 
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 3. Another request that was scrutinized in Washington and ultimately 
ignored was the request for ambulances. The request was sent to 
Washington, where it was scrutinized (and modified) by a FEMA analyst. 
Then it was shipped back down to Baton Rouge that evening so it could be 
reviewed by those on site in New Orleans. Following the review, the 
request then went back to Washington, where after several hours, it was 
transmitted to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s overnight desk 
along with a request for three hundred ambulances. The ambulance 
request was later canceled because the Department of Transportation, in 
the words of one FEMA official, “doesn’t do ambulances.” And it was 
only then that bus contractors, some located thousands of miles from New 
Orleans, were given the word to roll. All of these machinations were 
largely unknown (Block and Cooper 151). Emergency Support Functions 
in place prior to Hurricane Katrina were unable to operate effectively 
because coordination was not adequately planned and bureaucracy 
prevented expedient decision making. Because of this reality, leadership 
and organizational changes needed to occur to ensure that decisions in an 
emergency situation can be made to eradicate issues regarding the disaster. 
 4. Regrettably, the preexisting contracts that were in place prior to Katrina 
turned out to be more of a hindrance than help. FEMA had detailed 
unyielding regulations that governed all procurements, as there were long-
standing contracts in place to handle emergency supplies—deals that had 
been signed long before the storm. Due to the fact that the pre-existing 
contracted supplies would not arrive in the time required by rescuers, a 
FEMA representative decided to procure necessities through another 
avenue. When one FEMA employee practiced a little ‘contingency 
contracting’ of his own by procuring supplies from Wal-Mart, a day after 
his deal, a team of lawyers arrived at his office to take a statement. They 
told him they might pursue legal action against him for signing off on the 
Wal-Mart deal. Infuriated by the intrusion and by the insinuation, the 
employee settled in at his computer and silently typed out a three-line 
statement. “I did it,” the statement said. “I would do it again. The 
president would agree with it.” He signed the statement and handed it to 
the department’s general counsel, then he sat back down at his desk and 
turned away (Block and Cooper 215). 
 5. A key example of pre-planning not being adequate was the decision to 
relocate individuals to the Superdome in New Orleans. The idea was to get 
thousands of people into the Superdome, where they could seek shelter, 
food, and safety. However, the Superdome’s supplies could not sustain the 
individuals who had sought refuge there. Therefore, people were starving 
and thirsty, had no place to sleep, and were victims of crimes while in the 
Superdome because ample police officers were not stationed at the site. 
Because of this reality, future contingency planning on behalf of police 
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officers, emergency personnel, and first responders must also integrate 
adequate training and psychological counseling.  
 6. There were several factors that were not addressed immediately that 
resulted in the event being known as one of the worst response efforts to a 
natural disaster of all time, including not knowing how much food and 
water was needed to ensure that people did not experience further loss and 
devastation. Because of misrepresentations to the public as well as a 
deficit in resources, affected people began to panic, resulting in 
desperation and criminal activity. Subsequently, police and public service 
personnel could not match the amount of people in the general public who 
were lashing out. Following the disaster, residents that had evacuated were 
not able to return home to gather belongings or protect family heirlooms 
from looters. A further frustration to residents, there was no information 
provided by emergency responders on the future of the city. Thousands of 
people were left without food, water, power or shelter for days! As one 
resident of the 9th ward illustrated, following the storm residence in some 
areas were uncertain of the futures. “Looking out on the block, (Carolyn 
Parker) ticks off the status of each house. The one to her north, “the 
landlord has.” And the one to the south, “I find out this couple’s not 
coming back, so that’s probably up for sale. The next house right behind 
it, I don’t know if he’s coming back. ‘Cause that’s a senior citizen” 
(Wolff).  
 7. Lack of transportation and a well identified and publicized method of 
organized evacuation was another disappointing characteristic of 
Hurricane Katrina response. When individuals attempted to flee the city 
using the bridges, they were forced to return to the city while being held at 
gunpoint. Additionally, transportation in and out of the city as well as 
within the city was practically impossible.  
 8. A major source of frustration to family members looking for loved ones 
following the storm, inaccurate reports of survivors and decedents was 
released. For instance, in the case of the woman listed in number 6 above, 
“…After authorities found no trace of Parker for weeks, (so) the local 
newspaper pronounced her dead. But Parker had survived. She had been 
one of the last people to leave her neighborhood under mandatory 
evacuation and was one of thousands of other newly homeless victims of 
the storm” (Wolff). Contrary to the newspaper’s report, Parker was alive 
and was one of the first people to move back into her neighborhood. She 
lived in a FEMA trailer for 4 years, during which she advocated for the 
rebuilding of St David Catholic Church, the only Catholic Church that 
welcomed blacks when she was growing up.  
The entire episode cut to the heart of the major problems facing FEMA: As a part 
of the Department of Homeland Security, it had no real authority from the ground of a 
disaster, and it was unable to effectively communicate with federal, state, or private 
 57
industry. Most important, the poor oversight in the award and monitoring stages of 
contracting was the most recurrent and significant problem in the federal government’s 
response to Hurricane Katrina. “According to one Department of Homeland Security 
official, FEMA was authorized to hire approximately 60 contracting officers before 
Hurricane Katrina hit U.S. land—some government reports have stated that 172 
acquisition officials were needed. The agency, however, was severely understaffed—with 
only 36 contracting officers on staff” (Amey).  
Not as evident but just as damaging as the lack of personnel, the lack of 
institutional memory significantly hampered the recovery effort. Many government 
reports attributed the lack of oversight to the frequent rotation of officials in and out of 
the areas, and other acquisition officials being “borrowed” from other agencies. All too 
often, there was no overlap in the rotation, allowing valuable institutional memory and 
scenario-specific information to be lost.  
As a result of inadequate contracting staff, mistakes were multiplied, some of 
which have been detected by post-award audits. Members of the House Government 
Reform Committee found that mileage claims were overstated and duplicate bills were 
submitted for debris removal and other services. One of the most costly mistakes was an 
alleged computation error missed by FEMA officials that would have resulted in Bechtel 
double-billing the federal government $48 million, if it had not been found by the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency. These mistakes were only caught because of the 
tremendous emphasis on after-the-fact review. They might never have been made had the 
necessary oversight of government contracts been in place during the duration of the 
contract (Amey). 
Poor contract oversight is exacerbated by the lack of communication among 
agencies that delegated acquisition functions. For instance, FEMA tasked GSA to write 
three contracts in Louisiana for base camps, hotel rooms, and ambulances, worth over 
$120 million. GSA contracting officers awarded the contracts, but FEMA did not perform 
its oversight mission and the FEMA officials listed as the points of contact had no 
knowledge of the contracts. The GAO reported that “only after contacting multiple 
FEMA officials over a 3-week period were we able to determine the agency officials 
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responsible for contract oversight” (Amey). For instance, the so-called blue roof program 
was a scheme to provide temporary waterproofing of damaged structures by wrapping 
roofs in a sheet of blue plastic. It was costing some $3,000 per structure, though the 
actual price paid to the laborers performing the task was a fraction of the amount. The 
rest was going to middlemen—beneficiaries of massive no-bid contracts that FEMA had 
allotted to a handful of national companies, which in turn hired smaller firms to do the 
work. “Needless bureaucratic churning” was how Secretary Chertoff characterized the 
rich contracts, and he and top FEMA officials promised to rebid the work along more 
equitable lines. But months passed, and the contracts remained in place (Block and 
Cooper 273). 
Upon review, it was discovered that a great failure of FEMA’s previous disaster 
plans did not have enough detail, precisely because they were developed by people in 
government that have never lived in the Gulf region nor have they been first responders. 
Therefore, the planners did not fully comprehend what first responders would need to 
assist those in peril nor did they seek out those individuals that could provide the detailed 
required to create a reasonable recovery plan (Block and Cooper 287). 
Unfortunately, many of the problems FEMA and other responders suffered from 
were lack of preparedness for the extreme nature of the event and a lack of funding pre-
positioned for their needs. In the absence of the pre-positioned contracts or standing 
orders like the DOD possessed, FEMA expected that the bureaucratic ‘red tape’ would be 
eliminated to help them help residents of the Gulf Coast during their time of need. 
Unfortunately, that was not the case. There were long periods of time where FEMA 
personnel on site had to wait for contract approval. For instance, it took over a week for 
the U.S. Department of Transportation to finally deliver a full complement of 1,100 buses 
to New Orleans to evacuate survivors. In addition, it took over a week for transportation 
to begin moving the first commercial aircraft into the New Orleans airport, to whisk 
evacuees out of the ruined city (Block and Cooper 299). In addition to long-lead times, 
contracting officers proved that, while under pressure and forced to make quick 
purchasing decisions, due to inability to allow companies to compete, many contracts 
went to larger companies with well-known track records. Had communication been better 
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and contingency contracting better utilized, the wait time for relief could have been cut in 
half if not virtually eliminated. 
Another major disappointment regarding funding and spending was the fraudulent 
activity that occurred in Hurricane Katrina disaster relief investing. The oversight in 
federal spending resulted in penalties, including 239 arrests, nearly 200 indictments, and 
at least 80 convictions. According to Block and Cooper, “The majority of the 
indictments, arrests, and convictions have been against individuals who defrauded the 
government in petty crimes, rather than contractors caught exploiting the system on a 
large scale.” 
G. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Planning for future disasters similar to Hurricane Katrina immediately began after 
the event. “Considering hurricane season has a defined timeframe and these storms 
provide sufficient warnings in advance, there are plenty of opportunities to plan and 
preposition the logistical necessities required in the locations potentially impacted by 
hurricanes” (Block and Cooper). Therefore, there are a number of structural phases that 
cities in the United States should understand prior to dealing with natural disasters that 
inevitably occur. For instance, food, water, blankets, bedding, and shelter should be 
strategically organized in a manner that is structured, sustainable, and easily maintained. 
The purpose of these strategic locations is for bolstered mobility and sustainable 
accommodations. 
As evidenced throughout this report, it is clear that many challenges existed both 
in terms of the disaster itself and the response efforts that followed Hurricane Katrina. 
The largest and most significant challenge is the fact that there was lack of preparation 
for this event. Furthermore, the division of responsibilities assigned to organizations to 
ensure the effectiveness of the levees in New Orleans was faulty. This challenge included 
the fact that there were too many different organizations working on one aspect of the 
preparation, and unfortunately, each organization had a different goal, which prevented 
the cooperation and coordination of preparing for this disaster effectively. As illustrated 
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in Table 5, the costs associated with responding to and rebuilding after Hurricane Katrina 
were superfluous and some were possibly avoidable. 
 
Table 5.   New Orleans levee repairs costs  
(from Vicinity Hurricane Project 14) 
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To help prevent future abuses of contingency contracting capabilities, the Post-
Katrina Act required the Secretary of Homeland Security to draft regulations to limit to 
150 days the duration of any noncompetitive contract that is needed to meet an urgent 
and compelling need, that is in an amount greater than the simplified acquisition 
threshold, and that facilitates response to or recovery from a natural or man-made disaster 
or a terrorist incident. P.L. 109–295, § 695. However, to prevent abuse, the Administrator 
must submit a report to congress for every contract obtained using noncompetitive 
contracts. 
As part of the continuing effort to oversee the expenditure of federal funds in the 
Gulf Coast, the Inspector General (IG) for DHS has created an in-house position of 
assistant inspector general specializing in the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort. In 
addition, the Department of Justice has established a Hurricane Katrina Contract Task 
Force, which includes relevant offices of inspector general, to coordinate investigations 
and audits in this matter. The prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse in the Gulf Coast 
recovery effort remains a major congressional concern. 
Among the duties of the Administrator of FEMA, it has been discovered that the 
Administrator is required to prepare and submit to Congress annual catastrophic resource 
reports. These reports must, among other matters, identify the resources needed to 
undertake planning, training, regional office enhancement, surge capacity, logistics, state 
and local preparedness, and responsiveness to the National Response Plan. 
Communications proved to be a major challenge during the aftermath of Katrina. 
Poor communication between Washington and people “on the ground” exacerbated 
problems, even when they were all working for the same agency. For example, against 
the advice of FEMA officials in Alabama, FEMA Headquarters paid a federal contractor 
$10 million to renovate 160 rooms and furnish another 80 rooms in military barracks. As 
local FEMA officials had projected, the facility largely went unused. In fact, only six 
occupants were living at the facility when FEMA officials decided to shut it down 
(Amey). 
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Another component of organization and leadership that resulted from Hurricane 
Katrina response efforts is the Secretary of Defense is in charge of directing the Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau to furnish a list of capabilities of the National Guard. This list 
may include statewide mutual assistance agreements and the potential organizations that 
can enter contingency contracts to provide services in the events of a natural disaster of 
Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude. “In addition, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 
Chief of the National Guard Bureau to make this information available to the Northern 
Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and other organizations with federal military 
support to civil authority planning responsibilities.” Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the 
Department of Defense was not allowed to activate reserve units for catastrophic disaster 
relief involuntarily. However, Congress has considered removing this statutory restriction 
for the purpose of enhancing mobility in the event of a CONUS disaster in the future.  
Additionally, a Joint Capabilities Database was established after Hurricane 
Katrina by both the National Guard Bureau and the states involved in the disaster. The 
Joint Capabilities Database consists of inventory of capabilities and the agencies that can 
respond to certain aspects of the potential disasters. Other contingency agreements 
include the National Emergency Management Agency agreement that allows emergency 
situation information to be dispersed to all states within the United States, the National 
Guard tracking system to ensure that all facets of the disaster are not overlooked, and the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements, which ensures that 
communication is fluid among the NGB, the NEMA, and the United States Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) (Block and Cooper). 
Due to the significantly flawed response to Katrina, contingency contracting plans 
are now charged with possessing specific characteristics to ensure their effectiveness. 
Every plan must be feasible and actionable and concern many elements of disaster 
response, including resources, shelters, rebuilding methods, communication strategies, 
integration of local facilities and communities, and both state and federal government 
response (Block and Cooper 306). 
During this reform period, the need for better education for government personnel 
was identified, but it still took years for all government entities to take action. As early as 
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2003, The Naval Postgraduate School MBA Program sponsored an MBA Professional 
Report specifically covering Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Marine Corps 
Institute (MCI). The report, by Kenneth A Burger, Jonathan R Kehr, and Brian E 
Wobensmith focused on the development and publishing of a Contingency Contracting 
MCI to assist the Marine Corps in training its contract personnel in preparation for 
deployment to a contingency operation. Surprisingly, as recent as 2003, there was no 
requirement for the contracting specialist to attend a formal school prior to supporting a 
contingency operation! 
The purpose of their MBA Project was “to develop and publish a Contingency 
Contracting MCI to assist the Marine Corps in training its contract personnel in 
preparation for deployment to a contingency operation,” as there was no requirement for 
the contracting specialist to attend a formal school prior to supporting a contingency 
operation. …The Contingency Contracting MCI will aid the contracting personnel with 
the training needed to be successful in a contingency environment and efficiently and 
effectively support Marine Corps units abroad.” This project was sponsored by 
Headquarters Marine Corps, Installation & Logistics, Logistics Branch in conjunction 
with the Marine Corps Institute (MCI). A draft Contingency Contracting MCI is included 
in the report.” 
Within just two short years of the MBA report, Hurricane Katrina struck New 
Orleans, and virtually the same shortcomings were identified by the Gansler Report. The 
Gansler Commission, convened in 2007, was “an independent commission led by Dr. 
Jacques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, pointed to systemic problems in the Army’s contracting system. According to a 
2007 release from the Army, the report found that there were “not enough people, too 
little training, and an antiquated system” (Lee). 
The Gansler report made four recommendations:  
 Increase the stature, quantity and career development of contracting 
personnel  
 Restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management  
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 Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary operations  
 Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting 
effectiveness in expeditionary operations 
Gansler commended the DOD for making some headway in adding more 
contracting expertise with the announced Defense Acquisition Workforce Development 
Fund, which seeks to add 10,000 contracting professionals, but later worried that “we’re 
going to fill 10,000 seats with people without experience” (Mullen). Gansler also cited an 
upcoming Defense Science Board study to highlight the need to place much greater 
emphasis on service contracting, as most studies, rules, policies and mindsets are still 
focused on buying goods, despite the fact that services contracting is very different and 
comprises half the budget. 
 DOD’s certification training program—provided by the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU)—generally demonstrates the capability  
to provide effective training, though some attributes of an effective 
training program are lacking… However, DOD lacks complete 
information on the skill sets of the current acquisition workforce and  
does not have outcome-based metrics to assess results achieved in 
enhancing workforce proficiency and capability through training efforts. 
(Government Accountability Office)  
With a reduction in military force and a 20% reduction of the contracting 
workforce from 1998 to 2006, while the workload and the number of dollars associated 
with that workload experienced a five-fold increase, it could have been predicted that the 
government was heading for a contracting disaster ([H.A.S.C. No. 111–32] (One 
Hundred Eleventh Congress 83). 
Once the problems were properly identified and brought to the attention of 
deciding factors, the GAO recommended that the DOD establish milestones for 
developing metrics to measure how certification training improves acquisition workforce 
capability and a time frame for acquiring and implementing an integrated information 
system in order to mitigate losses and to rebuild. DOD concurred with the second but not 
the first recommendation. GAO continues to believe DOD needs to develop additional 
metrics. 
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The Gansler Commission assisted in the establishment of the Contingency 
Contracting Corps and training for individuals that wish to become members, yet 
contracting representatives are not afforded protections similar to those that Reservists 
enjoy due to USC Title 10, and therefore have no incentive to join the corps. There is 
currently no incentive for contracting officers to become members of the contingency 
contracting corps, nor any reward for helping to prepare for disasters. “A lack of training 
for the contracting specialist impedes the mission of the Marines in the battlefield. Fair 
and reasonable prices may not be achieved due to a lack of competition. This can be 
caused because the contracting specialists may not understand or be creative enough to 
locate potential sources to provide supplies and services required by the warfighter in a 
timely manner. Also, there are different rules, regulations, business practices, and 
customs that the specialists may not be aware of that can hinder the relations with the 
local population within the area of the contingency.” 
In an effort to resolve issues brought to light by the 2003 MBA Thesis and the 
Gansler Report, the DOD created the Army Contracting Command. Headquartered at 
Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, ACC is a two-star command with two subordinate one-
star commands—the Expeditionary Contracting Command (for locations outside the 
continental United States) and the Mission and Installation Contracting Command—and 
five major contracting centers that provide support to AMC’s life cycle management 
commands and MSCs. These centers provide contracting support to several program 
executive offices and program managers supporting the U.S. Army’s major acquisition 
programs. ACC offers the contracting expertise of some of the best-trained people in the 
Army, ready to support the war fighter while ensuring responsible stewardship of 
taxpayers’ funds (Army Contracting Command).  
Specifically, the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) (for locations 
outside the continental United States) and the Mission and Installation Contracting 
Command (MICC), accomplishes contingency contracting through seven contracting 
support brigades, eight contingency contracting battalions, and 83 contingency 
contracting teams throughout the world. In FY 2012, ECC executed more than 47,000 
contract actions worth almost $1.8 billion. In addition, the U.S. Army has specifically 
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created four contracting support brigades, which provide contract support and contract 
planning support to Army service component commanders.  
Its senior contingency contracting teams each consist of four-people able to 
provide contracting support at the division and brigade level. By the end of fiscal year 
2009, the Army activated 42 teams. “The teams, battalions, and brigades, are modular in 
nature and can be deployed worldwide in support of military operations. The teams and 
battalions get their day-to-day contracting training and work experience at our installation 
and contracting centers located across the Army Contracting Command” ([H.A.S.C. No. 
111–32] (One Hundred Eleventh Congress 83). Members of the ECC have the ability to 
deploy anywhere in the world on short notice to provide “operational contract support 
planning, contract policy and oversight, contract execution, contract administration and 
contractor surveillance in support of deployed forces” (Army Contracting Command). 
Better yet, when designated as the lead service for contracting, the ECC is ready to 
establish a joint theater support contracting command to provide contracting guidance 
and acquisition solutions for their customer! With a professional workforce comprised of 
657 military and 686 civilians, the ECC has the corporate knowledge and experience that 
the federal government should look to learn from and utilize in times of need (Army 
Contracting Command). 
In December 2011, as a member of the Contracting Functional Integrated 
Planning Team, the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) was 
made responsible for collaboration with the Defense Acquisition University to offer 
education for all contingency contracting personnel. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Program Support (DASD(PS)) was made responsible for oversight and 
management to enable the orchestration, integration, and synchronization of the 
preparation and execution of acquisitions for DOD contingency operations. In 
cooperation with the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and OSD, he serves as the DOD 
focal point for the community of practice and the community of interest for efforts to 
improve OCS program management and oversight and is responsible for the development 
of a programmatic approach for the preparation and execution of orchestrating, 
integrating, and synchronizing acquisitions for contingency operations (GPO). As the 
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DOD is routinely called upon to support in-country disasters, it should be noted that the 
Army has been identified by Congress to lead the contingency contracting ‘charge’ for 
the DOD and the federal government as a whole. 
Technological evolutions in contingency contracting include a synchronized pre-
deployment tracker—Enterprise Suite (SPOT -ES), Contingency Acquisition Support 
Model (cASM), and the three-in-one tool (3in1 Tool). These advancements have allowed 
contingency contracting to become more efficient.  
SPOT-ES was developed by the Department of Defense and has been designated 
as the joint Web-based database to assist the those individuals on site during an 
emergency “in maintaining awareness of the nature, extent, and potential risks and 
capabilities associated with contracted support in support of contingency operations, 
humanitarian or peacekeeping operations, or military exercises designated by” leadership 
(Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (USD(AT&L)). 
SPOT: 
 Serves as the central repository for up-to-date status and reporting on 
contingency contractor personnel. 
 Tracks contract capability information for all DOD-funded contracts 
supporting contingency operations, humanitarian or peacekeeping 
operations, or military exercises designated by the CCDR. 
 Provides by-name accountability of DOD-funded contingency contractor 
personnel and other personnel as directed by USD(AT&L) or by the 
CCDR. 
 Contains minimum contract information necessary to establish and 
maintain accountability and visibility of contractors and contract 
capabilities for all contracts awarded to support contingency operations, 
external and systems support contracts and contracting activities.  
Possibly the most important technological advance since Katrina are the cASM & 
3in1 Tool. The cASM assists planners in developing requirements for the situation and 
the 3in1 Tool allows those on site to order, receive and pay for goods and services 
provided. “The 3in1 tool is a technology-based solution to record and transfer data when 
conducting on-the-spot, over-the-counter, field purchases of supplies and non-personal 
services (cash and carry type purchases), which have traditionally been conducted using 
an SF44. The 3in1 Tool is a small lightweight device that will capture and record 
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purchase, payment, and receiving information including the user’s receipt of goods and 
vendor acknowledgement of payment. The device will automatically transfer that data to 
the 3in1 Module in the Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS)” (Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (USD(AT&L)). The cASM is a 
web-based tool that is simple and is “designed to assist those individuals responsible for 
initiating contracting requirements in an expeditionary environment. The application will 
identify the documents required to initiate a contract, provide templates for the 
documents, prompt the user for the information required to complete the documents, and 
will route the documents to the appropriate reviewers and approvers” (Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (USD(AT&L)). cASM will also alert 
individuals when it is their responsibility to take action on the requirements package. 
cASM’s output will then be a completed, approved contract requirements package for a 
forward deployed contracting office to take action. 
cASM has been designed for the Non-classified Internet Protocol (IP) Router 
Network (NIPERNet) use so, provided first responders have Internet connectivity, they 
can access cASM virtually anywhere! By accessing the cASM website at 
http://www.tqsapps.com, government personnel can not only complete training, but will 
eventually be able to download much needed forms and information. 
In an effort to better delineate roles and responsibilities during crisis, yet another 
technological tool has been developed. One such tool is a virtual experience immersive 
learning simulation (VEILS) entitled Barda Bridge, which was developed in 2008 by 
WILL Interactive, INC and the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) (Defense 
Acquisition University). The program allows the viewer to assign leadership positions as 
well as the roles of leaders to be defined. It also allows users to assign particular 
individuals to specific scenario if a disaster occurs. Additionally DAU has developed 
courses that train government personnel on the importance of contingency contracting. 
CON 334 is a four-day training session dealing with contingency contracting. However, 
prerequisites for the course are lengthy: CON 100, CON 121, CON 124, CON 127, CLC 
033, and CLC 058. Many military personnel do not have the time, nor do they make the 
 69
time to take courses voluntarily and on their off-time. And unfortunately, contracting 
officers are not required to complete the training at this time. 
Many lessons were learned following Katrina some of which came directly from 
American corporations that assisted in the immediate response and recovery efforts. Wal-
Mart delivered truckloads of supplies, including free prescription drugs, to those 
devastated by Hurricane Katrina almost immediately after the storm passed, rather than in 
the days—in some cases weeks—that it took government agencies to provide relief. The 
fundamental reason for such superior performance is that private ownership and the price 
system give competitive firms stronger incentives and better information on which to act 
quickly and flexibly during disasters (Horwitz 19). 
Wal-Mart was able to move food, water, generators and other goods to areas hit 
by hurricanes Katrina and Rita following each storm because it has an emergency 
operations center that is staffed every day around the clock by decision-makers who have 
access to all of the company’s systems. In one case, the company even provided stranded 
police officers with clothes and ammunition. In areas hit by Rita, illustrated below in 
Figure 15, Wal-Mart shipped donated clothes and supplies before FEMA was able to 
provide basic necessities. It has even reopened stores in places with no electricity. Due to 
Wal-Mart’s obsessive approach to communications and information sharing, they have 
been able to respond to crisis better and faster than the U.S. government. 
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Figure 14.  Walmart hurricane recovery support in action; Hurricane Rita  
(from The Design Observer Group ) 
During a less destructive hurricane, Wal-Mart ships between 200 and  
400 containers of goods for sale or relief. In the first two-and-a-half weeks following 
Katrina, Wal-Mart shipped 2,500 containers to the region and delivered another  
517 containers post-Rita. Wal-Mart also set up satellite links for its stores that lost phone 
or Internet service so that they could stay connected to headquarters; Wal-Mart stores in 
areas that were without power for weeks were able to keep generators in stock.  
Sadly, the Homeland Security’s senior officials never viewed the Wal-Mart 
arrangement as a success story. Nor did they fully understand that the Wal-Mart supply 
chain had been responsible for pushing the exact emergency supplies that were needed 
most. Instead, they quietly cut Wal-Mart a check for $300,000 and moved on. 
Unfortunately, state and local governments were not as enthusiastic about embracing new 
methods of procurement and tend to stifle those that develop new methods of operating. 
For instance, one FEMA employee was struck:  
when he saw storm victims being served peanut butter sandwiches that 
had been trucked in from Florida and canned beans from Ohio, at a cost of 
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$14 a day. Louisiana is the culinary capital of the nation, …and there was 
no reason to subject its citizens to the inferior grub that was being hauled 
in on tractor-trailers. With little prodding, the local chefs came up with a 
better menu than peanut butter and beans. For $13—a savings of $26,000 
per day—they whipped up a menu featuring seafood pasta and beef with a 
red wine mushroom sauce. The plan was brilliant on its face: better food 
for storm victims, a helping hand for local businesses struggling to survive 
the disaster, a better deal for the government. But Janet Hale nixed the 
idea. It was a violation, she said, of long-standing contracts for peanut 
butter sandwiches and canned beans. (Block and Cooper 85) 
While it may not be feasible for the federal government to wholly adopt Wal-
Mart’s organization or methods of operations, there are lessons that can and should be 
learned from their repeated ability to respond to crisis and to virtually immediately adapt 
and overcome barriers that seem insurmountable to others. 
Starbucks was also able to get aid to hurricane-ravaged areas quickly. When the 
company got a request from the American Red Cross to donate coffee, managers at 
headquarters contacted the company’s distributors to discuss how they could help. 
Starbucks determined that it could donate 30,000 pounds of coffee, 235,000 bottles of 
water and 44,000 pastries without affecting supplies to its retail stores. Efficient 
communication also helped many companies avoid losing goods in the storm. MIT’s 
Sheffi notes that GM was able to contact its dealers in New Orleans about moving their 
inventory out of the city and then sent car carriers to pick up the vehicles (Worthen). 
Reports issued by committees of the 109th Congress, the White House, federal 
offices of Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), among 
others, concluded that the losses caused by Hurricane Katrina were due, in part, to 
deficiencies such as questionable leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational 
failures, overwhelmed preparation and communication systems, and inadequate statutory 
authorities. As a result, the 109th Congress revised federal emergency management 
policies vested in the president; reorganized the FEMA and enhanced and clarified the 
mission, functions, and authorities of the agency, as well as those of its parent, the DHS. 
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Six statutes enacted by the 109th Congress are notable in that they contain 
changes that apply to future federal emergency management actions. These public laws 
include the following: 
 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, referred 
to in this report as the Post-Katrina Act; Sections of P.L. 109–347 (H.R. 
4954)  
 The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005, known as the 
SAFE Port Act; P.L. 109–308 (H.R. 3858) 
 The Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006; P.L. 109–
63 (H.R. 3650) 
 The Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005; P.L. 109–
67 (H.R. 3668) 
 The Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster Relief Act; and Sections of P.L. 
109–364 (H.R. 5122) 
 The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007.  
Most of these statutes contain relatively few changes to federal authorities related 
to emergencies and disasters. The Post-Katrina Act, however, contains many changes that 
will have long-term consequences for FEMA and other federal entities. That statute 
reorganized FEMA, expanded its statutory authority, and imposed new conditions and 
requirements on the operations of the agency. The Administration implemented the new 
authorities through the FY2008 appropriations legislation. The oversight plans of 
committees with jurisdiction indicate that Members of the 110th Congress evaluate the 
steps taken by the leadership of FEMA to carry out the expanded legislative mandate. In 
addition, Members continued to debate legislation pertaining to the recovery of Gulf 
Coast states. For example, H.R. 1144 would waive disaster assistance cost share 
requirements for the states affected by the hurricanes (Bea et al. 56). 
Hurricane Katrina brought to light that many in the “old” FEMA were ill 
equipped to handle the disaster because FEMA had become a “revolving door” for 
employees. Many used the federal job to launch careers in the civilian sector where they 
were paid more and had upward mobility. FEMA was underfunded, did not actually have 
the ability to gain command and control of emergency sites due to the fact that they were 
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not equipped with the necessary gear to operate, and did not invest in training and 
education for its employees.  
In an effort to minimize the continued loss of experience and corporate 
knowledge within the department, section 10102 of the Post-Katrina Act has charged the 
FEMA Administrator with development of a Strategic Human Capital Plan that evaluated 
workforce gap analysis, addressed skill and competency gaps, outlined needs and 
capabilities, and requires that Congress be updated every five years. In addition, the  
Post-Katrina Act requires that the Administrator outline the career paths of its employees, 
to include education, training, experience, and assignments necessary for career 
progression.  
In addition, in an effort to change the future of FEMA and to prevent the rapid 
turnover of staff that was seen pre-Katrina and during the recovery effort, the Post- 
Katrina Act authorizes the Administrator to pay recruitment and retention bonuses to 
individuals in positions that are difficult to fill or for which the retention of an 
employee’s considerable skills is essential and to provide for the professional 
development of employees by rotating them through various positions within DHS. The 
provisions authorizing the FEMA Administrator to pay recruitment and retention bonuses 
are the same as those which govern the payment of such bonuses by executive agency 
heads under 5 U.S.C. §5753 and 5 U.S.C. §5754, respectively.  
Additionally, the Act provides for the establishment of a Surge Capacity Force 
composed of individuals who will be deployed to respond to natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents. These 
individuals in the Force will be trained and deployed under Stafford Act authority. Force 
members are not counted against any personnel ceiling applicable to FEMA and may 
receive travel expenses (including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for 
other civilian federal employees) when participating in training related to their service on 
the Force. Most encouraging of all is the fact that personnel serving on the Force must 
receive appropriate and continuous training on FEMA’s programs and policies. As soon 
as practicable after enactment, the Administrator is to develop and implement the 
procedures for designating employees who are DHS employees (but not employees of 
 74
FEMA) and non-DHS federal employees to serve on the Force, along with other elements 
of the plan needed to establish that portion of the Force consisting of these individuals 
(PL. 109–295, §624.) While a noble thought, the act provides for the personnel during 
times of need, but does not prevent those volunteers from losing their established jobs 
upon their return to work. There are no protections established for the volunteers, unlike 
military Reservists are protected by U.S. Code Title 10. 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA used two groups of temporary employees to 
meet the unexpected (surge) needs of catastrophes: Disaster Assistance Employees 
(DAEs) and Cadre-On-Response Employees (CORE). The DAE detail was normally a 
brief deployment to disaster sites while the CORE detail lasted up to four years. A third 
group of temporary employees known as Disaster Temporary Employees (DTEs) was 
subsequently created to augment the DAEs. All three groups were substantially 
augmented by local hires at the disaster sites associated with Hurricane Katrina. 
The Post-Katrina Act not only suggests that personnel be retained once proven 
invaluable, but also allows for training for employees that either want or require it. “All 
employees must be provided with the opportunity to acquire the education, training, and 
experience, and as appropriate, participate in the Rotation Program (established under 
§622(a)) that will allow them to qualify for promotion.” In addition, the DHS has the 
responsibility of managing schools that deal with National Preparedness. The schools 
include the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Fire Academy, and 
the Emergency Management Institute (EMI). EMI specifically provides Contingency 
Contracting Courses both in-residence and distance learning options. The programs train 
individuals to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Some of the 
training programs are designed for personnel working in critical infrastructure sectors. 
Others are intended for personnel who are not identified with specific critical 
infrastructure but respond to terrorist attacks, regardless of location or target. 
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Figure 15.  Hurricane Katrina damage in New Orleans (from Young website) 
Regrettably, there is no evidence of a requirement for FEMA staff involved in 
contracting to be members of the Contingency Contracting Corps, nor is the evidence that 
they are required to receive training through Defense Acquisition University (DAU) or 
EMI prior to being hired by FEMA. It would stand to reason that now with the luxury of 
time on the government’s side, it would be to its benefit to ensure its budget staffers are 
trained and qualified to draft contingency contracts, know how they should be worked 
through the government system, and be ready to do so on a moment’s notice. The 
Contingency Contracting Corps web page even provides a checklist of items that should 
be packed in case of emergency, so if one is called up, they will have essentials to take 
care of themselves until assistance arrives. The training is available, but still 
underutilized. 
Despite the overwhelming amount of challenges and mistakes that occurred after 
Hurricane Katrina, one of the most important benefits and successes was the chance to 
reevaluate a failing system and bolster it for similar events in the future, such as 
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Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Even though New Orleans still has not recovered fully, as 
illustrated in Figure 16, the improvements to contingency contracting would not have 
been as wholly possible without the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.  
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Reports issued by committees of the 109th Congress, the White House, federal 
offices of Inspector General, and the GAO, have concluded that the losses caused by 
Hurricane Katrina were due, in part, to deficiencies such as questionable leadership 
decisions and capabilities, organizational failures, overwhelmed preparation and 
communication systems, and inadequate statutory authorities. As a result, the 109th 
Congress revised federal emergency management policies vested in the President; 
reorganized the FEMA and enhanced and clarified the mission, functions, and authorities 
of the agency, as well as those of its parent, the DHS. 
A large portion of the destruction witnessed following hurricane Katrina could 
have been avoided with a few e-mails, pre-placed funding, and training. Exercises had 
been run simulating the damage that was realized during Hurricane Katrina, but the 
information was not utilized nor was it shared. No one of authority took the initiative to 
identify properly trained personnel capable of meeting the unique contracting needs nor 
were the types and quantity of pre-existing contracts verified or vetted by FEMA or state 
officials. While the government struggled to provide food, water, and transportation to 
survivors due to bureaucratic “red tape” and first responder’s inability to identify 
personnel that could authorize the contract request and funding, private industry was able 
to respond literally within hours of the catastrophic event. Hurricane Katrina 
demonstrated the government’s inability to respond rapidly to enormous emergencies. It 
was evident that the U.S. government had changes to make if it wanted to keep up with 
private industry. 
 Due to its discoveries, the 109th Congress enacted six statues which contain 
changes that apply to future federal emergency management actions (Bea et al. 56): 
 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (the Post 
Katrina Act) 
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 The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005 (The Safe 
Port Act) 
 The Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 
 The Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005 
 The Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster Relief Act 
 The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007 
In an effort to maintain the federal ‘corporate’ knowledge of its contractors, 
Congress utilized section 10102 of the Post-Katrina Act to charge the FEMA 
Administrator with development of a Strategic Human Capital Plan that evaluated 
workforce gap analysis, thereby addressing skill and competency gaps, outlining needs 
and capabilities, and requiring that Congress be updated of his findings every five years. 
In addition, the Post-Katrina Act requires that the Administrator outline the career paths 
of its employees, to include education, training, experience, and assignments necessary 
for career progression.  
In hopes of preventing the rapid turnover of staff that was seen pre-Katrina and 
during the recovery effort, the Post- Katrina Act authorizes the Administrator to pay 
recruitment and retention bonuses to individuals in positions that are difficult to fill or for 
which the retention of an employee’s considerable skills is essential and to provide for 
the professional development of employees by rotating them through various positions 
within DHS. The provisions authorizing the FEMA Administrator to pay recruitment and 
retention bonuses are the same as those which govern the payment of such bonuses by 
executive agency heads under 5 U.S.C. §5753 and 5 U.S.C. §5754, respectively.  
Additionally, the Act provides for the establishment of a Surge Capacity Force 
composed of individuals who will be deployed to respond to natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents. These 
individuals in the Force will be trained and deployed under Stafford Act authority. Force 
members are not counted against any personnel ceiling applicable to FEMA and may 
receive travel expenses (including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for 
other civilian federal employees) when participating in training related to their service on 
the Force. Most encouraging of all is the fact that personnel serving on the Force must 
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receive appropriate and continuous training on FEMA’s programs and policies (PL. 109–
295, §624).  
The Post-Katrina Act not only suggests that personnel be retained once proven 
invaluable, but also allows for training for employees that either want or require it. “All 
employees must be provided with the opportunity to acquire the education, training, and 
experience, and as appropriate, participate in the Rotation Program (established under 
§622(a)) that will allow them to qualify for promotion.” In addition, the DHS has the 
responsibility of managing schools that deal with National Preparedness and the training 
of and implementation of better processes for Contingency Contracting Officers to 
follow. The schools include the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National 
Fire Academy, and the Emergency Management Institute (EMI). EMI specifically 
provides Contingency Contracting Courses both in-residence and distance learning 
options. The programs train individuals to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks. Some of the training programs are designed for personnel working in 
critical infrastructure sectors. Others are intended for personnel who are not identified 
with specific critical infrastructure but respond to terrorist attacks, regardless of location 
or target.  
In an effort to specifically address the need for better contingency contracting 
officers within the DOD, Congress identified the Army to lead the contingency 
contracting ‘charge’ for the DOD. The ACC, headquartered at Redstone Arsenal in 
Alabama, is a two-star command with two subordinate one-star commands and five 
major contracting centers that provide support to AMC’s life cycle management 
commands and MSCs, all designed to provide contracting support to several program 
executive offices and program managers supporting the U.S. Army’s major acquisition 
programs. ACC offers the contracting expertise of some of the best-trained people in the 
Army, ready to support the war fighter while ensuring responsible stewardship of 
taxpayers’ funds (Army Contracting Command).  
In addition to the corporate knowledge provided by the Army, the Gansler Report 
suggested the establishment of the Contingency Contracting Corps and required that the 
government provide education to contractors. While all of the congressional requirements 
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have been met, there is still no requirement for federal contractors to become members  
of the CCC nor are there any incentives for membership. While a noble thought, the  
act provides for the personnel during times of need, but does not prevent those  
volunteers from losing their established jobs upon their return to work. There are  
no protections established for the volunteers, unlike military Reservists are protected by 
U.S. Code Title 10. 
While training is readily available at FLETC, NFA, and EMI, and DAU, EMI 
specifically provides Contingency Contracting Courses both in-residence and distance 
learning options. However, there is no evidence of a requirement for FEMA staff 
involved in contracting to be members of the Contingency Contracting Corps, nor is the 
evidence that they are required to receive training through DAU or EMI prior to being 













V. HURRICANE SANDY (2012) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Eighteen years after the Northridge earthquake and seven years after Hurricane 
Katrina, the United States would be struck by another natural disaster that will be etched 
in American’s memories for years to come. Fortunately, the lessons learned from 
Northridge, Katrina, and other disasters played a significant role in preparing for and 
responding to Hurricane Sandy. Everything did not go right with the preparations and 
response to Sandy, but many things did go fairly well. Contingency contracting 
preparations and response, along with other essential response elements, greatly assisted 
in the response to Sandy and showed that FEMA and other government organizations do 
have a “learning curve” when it comes to disaster response. 
B. THE HURRICANE AND PREPARATIONS 
Hurricane Sandy struck the eastern seaboard of the United States early in the 
morning on October 29, 2012, making landfall near Brigantine, New Jersey. While only 
classified as a Category 1 hurricane as she came ashore, the storm would quickly earn its 
place in the history books as one of the worst natural disasters that has ever happened in 
the United States. 
Hurricane Sandy began from a tropical wave in the western Caribbean Sea on 
October 22, 2012. Within hours of forming, the storm was officially labeled as Tropical 
Storm Sandy. Sandy moved slowly northward and increased in strength, reaching 
Hurricane status on October 24th as she approached the Greater Antilles islands. Sandy’s 
first victims were in Kingston, Jamaica where one person was killed and approximately 
$100 million in damage was done. As she moved northward from Jamaica as a Category 
2 hurricane, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were hit next and both countries suffered 
severe flooding that left hundreds of thousands homeless and 55 dead. 
Hurricane Sandy continued her journey northward, soon wreaking havoc on Cuba 
and then the Bahamas, both locations suffering fatalities and extensive flooding, 
something which Sandy proved to be remarkably efficient at. After the Bahamas, the 
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storm emerged into the Atlantic as a Category 1 storm and continued on a largely 
north/northwest trajectory (Figure 17). At this point, virtually all models predicted the 
storm would make landfall in the United States. However, it was not yet possible to 
predict exactly where it would make landfall and what areas would be most affected.  
 
Figure 16.  Hurricane Sandy storm track (from The Weather Channel website) 
On Sunday, October 28,th the storms track began to solidify and the models began 
to predict landfall somewhere between the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, with the 
states of Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey as the likely candidates to receive Sandy 
first. As the storm moved northward it lashed the entire eastern seaboard with high winds 
and rain, causing extensive flooding in many areas that never received anything close to 
hurricane force winds. In fact, before Hurricane Sandy was done, the storm would affect 
24 states, ranging from Florida to Maine and westward as far away as Michigan and 
Wisconsin. Even Canada was affected and suffered two fatalities in Ontario and  
$100 million in damage throughout Quebec and Ontario. 
During the night of October 28th, the storm made its final course adjustments 
while over the Atlantic and set its sights on the Jersey shore for landfall on the morning 
of the 29th. Hurricane Sandy at this point was immense and became the largest north 
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Atlantic hurricane on record, spanning over 1,100 miles in diameter. Because of the 
storms landfall location in proximity to the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, large and 
dangerous storm surges were expected in these two bodies of water and surrounding 
tributaries. 
As Sandy churned over New Jersey and continued north toward New York, she 
left widespread power outages, flooding, downed trees and fatalities in her wake (Sandy 
Hook, NY, Hurricane Sandy flooding). New York City would suffer particularly badly, 
with flooded streets, tunnels and subways that literally paralyzed the city for weeks to 
come. In the aftermath of Sandy, the New Jersey shore communities (Figure 18) and the 
New York City area would greatly benefit from governmental relief efforts and 
contingency contracting for services such as fuel, food and water, sanitation services and 
particularly debris clean up. 
 
Figure 17.  Hurricane Sandy; New Jersey shore community flooding and damage  
(from FEMA website)  
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Prior to Hurricane Sandy making landfall in New Jersey, surrounding local and 
state governments, along with the federal government began to prepare for the storms 
arrival. National media coverage included areas as far inland as Ohio and urged them to 
prepare accordingly for the impending hurricane and highlighted the fact that the location 
of landfall and areas that would be hardest hit was still uncertain (Gibbs and Holloway 3). 
As storm preparation plans were implemented, it gradually became apparent that landfall 
was going to take place in New Jersey and that New York City would also be seriously 
impacted.  
With this knowledge, several key events happened. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), who is the lead agency within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) for disaster response, activated emergency response plans and 
began establishing incident support bases in various states, setting up logistical staging 
areas and deploying incident management teams.  
FEMA also executed an existing contingency contract for ground fuel with the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), pre-positioning 60 refueling trucks in the northeast 
and later adding another 240+ trucks to the operation as the magnitude of the disaster 
emerged in the days following the storm (Shawn). This action proved to be prescient and 
significant because fuel was critically short for first responders and generators during the 
early stages of the disaster. 
Of significance during the preparation stages, the acquisition and contracting 
flexibilities allowed under FAR 18.201 (increased thresholds for micro-purchases, 
Simplified Acquisitions, and SF44s) and FAR 18.203 (preference given to local 
businesses during declared major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act) were authorized after the President made emergency 
declarations on 29 Oct for the eleven states who were clearly going to be impacted 
(Tucker).  
One confusing area regarding the use of acquisition flexibilities during disasters is 
when are they actually authorized? With the emergency and major disaster declarations 
by the president, it was then up to the “head of agency,” in this case the Department of 
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the Interior Assistant Secretary for Policy Management and Budget to specifically specify 
and authorize the acquisition flexibilities to be granted for use. The Department of the 
Interior followed up the declarations with a Department of the Interior Acquisition Policy 
Release (DIAPR) on November 2, 2012, which formally granted the use of the 
acquisition flexibilities and also added specific guidance on Justification and 
Authorizations (J&A) and Determinations and Findings (D&F) (Department of the 
Interior ). 
The following day the Governors of New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut all 
requested and were granted major disaster declarations by the President (FEMA). A 
major disaster declaration is a more significant designation than an “emergency 
declaration” and under the Stafford Act allows for significant funding and relief efforts to 
affected states and local communities (McCarthy). More states would receive a 
presidential disaster declaration in the days and weeks to come. 
As part of their pre-hurricane preparations FEMA also coordinated with the DOD 
and alerted them that assistance may be required. NORTHCOM, the DOD combat 
commander responsible for North America was the lead agency that coordinated the 
overall DOD response to Hurricane Sandy. Post-Katrina analysis revealed significant 
weakness in DOD support to FEMA and in the aftermath of Katrina, much energy and 
time has been spent detailing where the weakness were and making recommendations to 
fix the issues. Issues such as overall unity of command, coordination between active, 
reserves and National Guard components, multi-state National Guard support, timeliness 
of DOD response, and technical (equipment) integration challenges between units all 
were common themes that emerged from Katrina (U.S. Government). 
Many of these FEMA/DOD issues were addressed with changes to policy and 
legislation in the years between Katrina and Sandy. The idea and evolution of the “dual-
status” commander, an officer who can command both National Guard and active duty 
forces was developed and implemented and achieved some success, albeit limited, during 
Hurricane Sandy. The issue of multi-state National Guard unit coordination also occurred 
during Sandy and it appears that the same challenges that surfaced during Katrina also 
happened during Sandy, indicating little to no progress in this particular area. These and 
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other issues will be further analyzed later in this chapter. Additionally, we will also 
review what post Katrina DOD changes were successfully implemented and proven 
during Hurricane Sandy, which were not, and recommend further changes to continue the 
efforts to enhance DOD integration into the National Response Framework (NRF).  
FEMA pre-hurricane personnel deployments for Hurricane Sandy were on par 
with Hurricane’s Isaac and Irene and their post-storm personnel response far exceeded 
those Isaac and Irene (Figure 19). By most accounts, FEMA was reasonably well 
prepared in most disaster response areas but in some areas their preparations fell short 
and were not sufficient during the initial response phase.  
 
Figure 18.  Hurricane Sandy FEMA response compared to Hurricane’s Isaac and Irene  
(from FEMA website) 
In New York, Mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, activated New 
York City’s Coastal Storm Plan (CSP) and ordered a mandatory evacuation of the five 
densely populated boroughs in New York City. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons 
very few residents chose to evacuate, particularly from “Zone A” which included most 
areas likely to be flooded and damaged by storm water (Gelinas 12). Some of the reasons 
people chose not to evacuate were the desire to protect property from looters, too old or 
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disabled to move easily, lack of transportation, and failing to realize how bad Sandy 
would actually be. To compound the problem of residents remaining in high-risk areas, 
very few had stockpiled enough supplies to last for a couple weeks. This lack of planning 
would create additional challenges during the recovery phase.  
New York’s City’s CSP had been created in 2000 for just such an event and had 
been used once previously for Hurricane Irene in 2011. The CSP is a comprehensive 
natural disaster plan that addresses areas such as Continuity of Operations, Search and 
Rescue, Emergency Operations Center standup and Logistics. Contingency contracting 
and the importance of being able to quickly contract for needed services is addressed in 
several areas of the CSP, specifically the Logistics section and the Citywide Incident 
Management System (CIMS) section (New York University).  
New York City was not the only city with existing hazardous weather/natural 
disaster plans in place. Wilmington, Delaware; Philadelphia; Boston and most coastal 
towns had weathered hurricanes and northeasters in the past and had standing plans that 
were put into action. In Boston, as part of the city’s emergency preparations, local power 
companies contracted for additional utility repair technicians to be on standby to help 
repair damage to power lines and other power grid infrastructure after the storm had 
passed (Boston Globe).  
All along the east coast, state, city and local Emergency Response Centers sprang 
to life and prepared for Hurricane Sandy. In Pennsylvania, on October 26th the 
Pennsylvania Emergency Operation Center was up and functioning, coordinating efforts 
with local Emergency Response Centers, the Red Cross and the National Guard 
(Marcheskie). Further up the coast in Rhode Island, the governor made a Declaration of 
Emergency on October 28, 2013, and the state’s Emergency Management Agency had 
been functioning several days prior to the declaration (Wikipedia). At a local level, cities 
and towns of all sizes activated their local Emergency Response Centers to support their 
communities.  
Thanks to accurate weather forecasting and existing natural disaster plans, as 
Sandy approached the northeast on October 29, 2013, the areas in the pathway of 
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Hurricane Sandy were reasonably well prepared for the storm’s impact and they had 
handled the preparations in an organized and effective manner (Gibbs and Holloway 9). 
In fact, in terms of disaster preparedness to include contingency contracting planning, the 
areas hardest hit by Hurricane Sandy were, by the standards existing at the time, about as 
prepared as they could be. Unfortunately, the power and magnitude of the storm was just 
too much and no level of preparations would have spared much of the northeast 
significant devastation and a very challenging recovery period. 
C. RESPONSE: IMMEDIATE AND LONG TERM 
At the Executive level, the immediate response was President Obama’s 
declaration of New Jersey, New York and Connecticut as “Major Disaster Areas” on 
October 30th, paving the way for real response efforts to begin (FEMA). Many other 
states were declared “Major Disaster Areas” also as time and events unfolded.  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), operating underneath the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary federal agency tasked with 
responding to natural disasters. With that role, it is no surprise that FEMA was at the 
forefront of response efforts for Hurricane Sandy. According to FEMA’s Hurricane 
Sandy After-Action Report, their stated immediate response goals were: 
In the first 72 hours of response operations, FEMA focused efforts on 
supporting first responders to save lives, maintain safety, restore power, 
and stabilize communities with the FEMA Administrator emphasizing 
response priorities as: people, power restoration, points of distribution for 
commodities, and pumping flooded tunnels. (FEMA)  
Because of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s initial community 
recovery efforts for Hurricane Sandy were improved over Katrina’s response. However, 
not all went well and like previous FEMA disaster responses, lack of organization and 
planning continued to plague FEMA in some areas.  
One FEMA team from the Washington D.C. area was rushed to Fort Dix, New 
Jersey prior to the storms arrival. Once they arrived, the onsite FEMA coordinator told 
them “I don’t know why you were rushed here because we don’t need you.” After the 
storm passed they waited days for a mission to be assigned to them, all the while 
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watching the destruction and recovery efforts on television even though they were only a 
short distance from areas with significant storm damage. The team’s leader pleaded with 
local coordinators to give his unit a mission and told his supervisor back in Washington 
that “My people are being told to go sightseeing” and that personnel resources were being 
wasted (Chiramonte). The team was eventually committed to the recovery but not exactly 
the type of organization one would expect during a recovery effort as massive as Sandy’s 
where recovery personnel were certainly needed in many areas.  
One of the key agencies that support’s FEMA during disaster recoveries is the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). During Sandy the USACE performed an 
incredible amount of work both during the immediate response and probably more 
significantly during the long-term efforts to de-water flooded areas, remove debris, and 
restore beaches and sand dunes.  
One significant contracting feature of the USACE is their Advanced Contracting 
Initiative (ACI). This program began in 1999 and allows for the award of Indefinite 
Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Single Award Task Order Contracts (SATOC) and 
Multiple Award Task Order Contracts (MATOC) before a disaster ever occurs (USACE). 
These contracts are primarily used for debris removal but also for power generation 
(generators), general construction, and other areas (Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 15). Currently the 
USACE has standing debris removal ACI contracts with five companies within the 
United States.  
Having learned hard lessons in the past with respect to responsiveness to natural 
disaster recoveries, the USACE developed the ACI program to be better prepared to 
execute their missions quickly and without the normal processing time that government 
contracting actions take. During Hurricane Sandy the USACE executed several of their 
debris removal and general contracting ACI contracts during the preparation phase of the 
recovery, greatly speeding the recovery in certain areas that were devastated with mixed 
debris of all kinds (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 66).  
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The USACE’s use and refinement of ACI contracts during Hurricane Sandy is a 
shining example of an organization thinking ahead and responding to a repeat after action 
item from other natural disaster responses. The ACI program was developed prior to 
Hurricane Katrina but in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned 
document it mentions several times the need for existing pre-arranged contracts to be in 
place prior to a disaster striking. As already noted, some state and cities are also 
following suit and entering into standing contingency contracts as part of their standing 
disaster relief plans.  
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is another of the federal agencies that 
FEMA often uses to support disaster relief. As previously mentioned, DLA had existing 
contingency contracts for fuel trucks and they pre-staged about 60 trucks prior to Sandy’s 
arrival. When FEMA requested fuel on Nov 1st, the fuel trucks were on station and 
supporting within hours. The number of fuel trucks contracted by DLA would grow 
rapidly over the next several weeks (Shawn 5). DLA also contributed significantly in the 
early phases of the response with logistics support of food, water, cots, and clothing. 
Also, many of the de-watering pumps used by the USACE were procured and shipped by 
the DLA (Shawn 6). 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is another federal agency that often provides 
support to FEMA during natural disaster recoveries. During Sandy, the DOD at the 
federal and state (National Guard) levels provided a large amount of support. On  
30 October, Secretary of Defense Panetta directed that the DOD provide any support 
requested by FEMA during the recovery (FEMA). At the federal level, the DOD worked 
with FEMA to determine how to best use DOD assets before putting plans in motion. 
Unfortunately, the requirement to work together to determine how to best employ DOD 
forces cost precious time and was something that should have been done prior to the 
disaster occurring. DOD’s timeliness of response to major disasters has often been 
criticized and Hurricane Sandy is no exception; more to follow on this subject. At the 
state National Guard level, eleven Governors called out their Nation Guard with a total of 
7,400 Guardsman responding to the call. National Guard personnel responded quickly 
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and worked with first responders during search and rescue missions, conducing route 
clearing, and delivery of supplies (FEMA).  
One area that has plagued DOD and National Guard support during previous 
natural disaster recoveries is a lack of “unity of command” (GAO). This issue arises 
when both National Guard troops, who are “owned” by the state’s governor and generally 
operate under Title 32 U.S.C. and federal troops (Army, Marines, etc.) who are “owned” 
by the Secretary of Defense and generally operate under Title 10 U.S.C. both respond to a 
disaster but come with their own chains of command and tasking authority. This creates a 
confusing and disjointed approach to the overall DOD response and both military 
organizations are left uncertain of who is in charge, who is coordinating the overall DOD 
efforts, and who has tasking authority for the state and federal units.  
DOD has grappled with how to address the “unit of command” issues for some 
time and the answer that has emerged is the “dual-status” commander. The concept of a 
“dual-status” commander was developed during the 2004 G-8 Summit in Georgia and 
was eventually officially embraced in January 2010 when ten governors met with 
Secretary of Defense Panetta to formally agree on the concept and implement it (Insinna). 
A dual-status commander can be a Guard or active duty officer who has been specially 
trained and can command both federal and National Guard troops. The dual-status 
commander concept was used twice prior to Sandy during Hurricane Isaac and the 
Colorado wildfires. However, it had never been used during a disaster the magnitude of 
Sandy. 
During Sandy multiple dual-status commanders were utilized but the 
implementation was weak and the results were only marginally successful. Additionally, 
the concept had only been developed for use with a single state’s National Guard forces 
and federal forces. The Sandy response included multiple states (eleven states’ National 
Guard units) and the framework for that had never been developed. The GAO “Civil 
Support” article mentions several relevant observations from the Sandy NORTHCOM 
and U.S. Army after action reports: 
 
 92
 The command and control structure for dual-status commanders, the joint 
coordinating element, and higher headquarters was unclear to federal 
military personnel. 
 Command relationships were not initially clear to all personnel, and some 
missions were executed without the approval/awareness of the dual-status 
commander. 
 There was not a well-defined chain of command or process to manage 
coordination of efforts of forces not assigned to a task force or dual-status 
commander. 
 
Clearly, the use of dual-status commanders during Sandy was not a huge success 
but the concept does appear to be a step in the right direction. With further refinement, 
development of models for multi-state disasters, exercise and actual use in future 
disasters, the dual-status commander should make future DOD disaster responses more 
coordinated and efficient. However, like any military operation, without routine exercises 
and realistic training events, the concept will always fall short during actual execution—
when it really matters. Funding and support for yearly CONUS disaster response 
exercises is imperative to prevent more “lessons learned” while DOD is actually 
participating in disaster relief in conjunction with DHS. Yearly NORTHCOM/DHS 
coordinated training MUST happen to bridge the current gap between these two 
organizations. Realistic yearly training that is hosted in various geographical areas of the 
country and simulates the major natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, 
tornadoes etc.) likely to be supported by DOD is the only way to make the DOD response 
more effective and timely. I would also propose a large-scale quadrennial DOD/DHS 
training event that simulates a Hurricane Sandy type natural disaster and forces all major 
stakeholders to participate and work side by side as they would during the real thing.  
At the state and local levels during the immediate response the State Police, 
County Sheriffs, local police and EMS personnel were the real face of the response for 
the first 24 hours or so. As always, they had to deal with the immediate shock of being 
first on the scene to some horrific and heart breaking situations. The information received 
from them was instrumental in identifying where the hardest hit areas where and where to 
direct follow on assistance to save lives and property.  
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After the first 72 hours the follow on, longer-term response began—and some 
cracks began to show in FEMA’s efforts and organization. Within this phase of the 
response there were significant contingency contracting actions which supported the 
recovery efforts. At the highest level, FEMA continued to coordinate the recovery efforts, 
seeking to synchronize the response efforts of all the various agencies, avoid duplicative 
efforts and ensure resources were being used efficiently and effectively.  
However, down at the street level of FEMA’s response, all was not well and there 
were some problem areas. As had happened in previous FEMA responses, it seemed that 
the survivor centric focus was lost somehow and the level of communication at various 
levels was poor.  
“Nobody communicates anything with you” was what Joe Casale of Breezy Point, 
N.Y. had to say about FEMA as he struggled to get his home repaired in the aftermath of 
Sandy. Poor communication seemed to be a recurring theme with FEMA throughout 
Sandy; poor communication prior to the storm regarding what to expect during the 
recovery phase, FEMA employees in the field who did not know what to tell survivors, 
and poor communication with survivors after the storm while trying to get FEMA 
assistance all are recurring themes during Hurricane Sandy (Leitsinger).  
By most accounts FEMA did a decent job getting personnel into place prior to the 
storm and setting up recovery operations in the correct areas. During the first 72 hours 
when survival and helping victim’s basic needs were the goals, FEMA functioned fairly 
well but there were also reports of undertrained FEMA personnel in the field who simply 
did not know what to tell survivors—precisely when they desperately needed information 
on what to do. But as the recovery merged into the longer term, more deliberate phase, 
other problems surfaced at FEMA. As residents sought assistance with home repairs and 
rebuilding, it seemed that FEMA was unable to communicate effectively regarding HOW 
the programs functioned and once a person applied, there was very little follow up 
communication regarding a claim’s status.  
About a month after Sandy, frustrations with FEMA programs boiled over at a 
Staten Island meeting with FEMA arranged by the borough’s President James Molinaro. 
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Resident Scott McGrath, who had met President Obama during a recent tour of the Sandy 
destruction when Obama had pledged to “cut through the red tape” for Sandy victims was 
very frustrated. “You were there when I met Obama, and I told the president….that the 
middle class was getting the royal finger. And he said ‘FEMA works for me.’” “FEMA 
ain’t doing nothing,” McGrath added. “They keep going around in circles.” Other 
residents echoed McGrath’s frustrations and anger and the meeting became a shout down 
as over 1000 residents shouted at FEMA officials who were forced to cower, listen and 
write down the complaints.  
Farther south in Highlands, New Jersey, Kathy Self applied for FEMA assistance 
and was given a claim number and when she called to check on her claim status the 
recording simply said “You do not qualify” with no explanation. When she applied, 
nobody at FEMA bothered to explain to Self the process and different levels of 
assistance, how private insurance interacts with FEMA programs and how second homes 
(vacation homes) are treated under FEMA programs (they are not eligible). Self was in 
tears over the “You do not qualify” recording but in reality it was just the first step in the 
process and did not mean she was not eligible for other types of FEMA assistance. In 
reality she was eligible but her claim could not be settled until her private insurance 
company had made their assessment first. It is true that individuals must take some 
responsibility for asking questions and learning the process during something like a 
disaster recovery but FEMA did not do anyone any favors with their lack of up-front 
information regarding their programs and policies (McGlone). 
One quotable quote regarding communication from FEMA is from Alberto Pilot, 
FEMA’s Public Information Officer. When asked about issues such as the one that Kathy 
Self dealt with, Pilot said “Most of the confusion about FEMA coverage and assistance 
results from a misunderstanding of FEMA’s mission. FEMA is just temporary assistance. 
The disaster loans are meant to get you back where you were” (McGlone). That is great 
information—but only FEMA knows it! FEMA’s pre-storm communication plan, or lack 
thereof, was very weak and is at least partially to blame for much of the confusion that 
resulted during the recovery phase. The sad part is, with current technologies, there is no 
excuse for it.  
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With a multitude of ways to disseminate information electronically these days, 
FEMA should have been pushing FEMA program and processes information to 
potentially affected areas days before the storm’s arrival. Text messaging, email, 
television, smart phone Apps, Facebook, Twitter to just name a few are low cost and 
effective ways to spread mass information to people. Before people are devastated by a 
disaster and computers and phones are no longer charged, they need to at least have the 
opportunity to read about FEMA programs and processes so they have an idea of what to 
expect during the recovery phase if they truly are hit hard and need assistance. FEMA 
need only to look at NYC’s disaster preparedness and response plan to see an effective 
communications plan similar to what I described above. NYC’s plan was used the first 
time during Hurricane Sandy and is considered one of the success stories from the city’s 
response.  
One noteworthy FEMA program that appears to have promise is the Rapid 
Repairs program. A similar program called Sheltering and Temporary Power (STEP) 
program was stood up in NYC and operated by the city. With so many houses damaged 
and people needing shelter, these programs sought to rapidly repair houses enough to 
make them habitable again and allow families to move back in. Cas Holloway, Deputy 
Mayor for NYC Operations, summed up the program: 
We thought some basic repair work….that would enable families to 
basically shelter in place, be in their homes, be safe and then begin the real 
work of rebuilding and doing it in their communities not away from 
(them). 
Repairs largely consisted of restoring electrical power, heat, and water. Many 
Sandy victims lauded these programs but they were mainly the ones at the front of  
the list who had their work done early. In New York City three months after Sandy, some 
7,000 households were still waiting for the work to be completed.  
The FEMA Rapid Repairs program is a good concept and getting people back into 
their homes as quickly as possible is essential to getting people back to work and 
rebuilding their communities. The Rapid Repairs program was initiated two weeks after 
Sandy and eventually nine general contractors were hired with over one hundred sub-
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contractors. Perhaps if the program had existed prior to the recovery and contracts 
already existed with the general contractors, the program could have been more efficient 
and timely during execution. David Abramson, the deputy director for Columbia 
University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness said he was impressed with the 
Rapid Repairs concept because it addressed some key barriers facing communities when 
they begin the recovery process, such as having credentialed and trusted contractors. He 
also added that with respect to the program and Hurricane Sandy recovery, “I think it 
falls in the category of good plan, poor implementation” (Leitsinger).  
Other federal agencies supporting FEMA continued to pour personnel and money 
into the Hurricane Sandy response. The DLA expanded its logistical support operations, 
moving fuel, clothing, and engineering equipment around the response area. DLA would 
ultimately deliver over 18 million gallons of fuel during the recovery and at one point had 
286 fuel trucks on contract making deliveries (DLA Loglines). The Health and Human 
Services (H&HS) department mobilized 850 medical and public health personnel in 
support of FEMA. The Department of Energy (DOE) established a “fuel hotline” to help 
identify gas stations that required electrical generators to restore operations and be able to 
distribute fuel. The USACE steadily ramped up its de-watering operations in New York 
and New Jersey, ultimately removing 470 million gallons of water from fourteen separate 
locations (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 66).  
The DOD’s efforts significantly increased during the follow on response phase, 
although efforts were never fully coordinated and as mentioned previously, suffered from 
lack of coordination and overall unity of command. Ultimately over 4,000 personnel from 
all services deployed to the recovery area, to include three Navy ships with the 26th 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked. Helicopters from the 26th MEU played a 
pivotal role conducting logistics movements around the recovery area, particularly with 
generators and electrical infrastructure equipment. Army and Navy divers conducted pier 
repairs and recovery at the World Trade Center site and Marine and Air Force engineers 
assisted with de-watering operations at various locations around New York City. Lastly, 
the U.S. Coast Guard, actually part of DHS, conducted search and rescue and maritime 
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security missions in the waters surrounding the recovery area. Truly a “joint” DOD 
response if ever there was one (FEMA website timeline). 
At a more local level, New York City continued their internal recovery efforts, 
contracting for 150 electricians to restore power in 400 buildings that were part of the 
New York Housing Authority. They also contracted for car and boat towing and removal 
services, eventually removing over 3400 derelict cars and 180 wayward boats. The NYC 
Human Resources Administration contracted for 719,000 lunches and dinners (Gibbs and 
Holloway 39). Worthy of mention, New York City’s official After Action report 
mentions numerous times the need to have standing contracts in place for key recovery 
services prior to a disaster (Gibbs and Holloway 34). This is a recurring theme with other 
organizations and as we have seen from the USACE and DLA, many agencies have 
moved toward standing contingency contracts that significantly reduce response time 
when disasters strike.  
One NYC organization that truly shined during Hurricane Sandy was the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). The MTA manages subways, commuter 
rail lines, and all the tunnels in NYC. MTA showed real leadership by making an early 
decision to shut down their operations in time to move most equipment (buses, rail cars 
etc.) to higher ground, saving them from being flooded with corrosive salt water—as 
happened in Hoboken, NJ on the other side of the Hudson River.  
Once Sandy passed, MTA quickly began work on restoring some level of mass 
transit service to the city. With subway and train tunnels flooded, the city put over three 
hundred buses into use as an improvised mass transit service that moved recovery 
volunteers around and allowed some people to return to work, long before the commuter 
trains and subways were running again. MTA chairman Joe Lhota stated afterward: 
For three days, we had to improvise. We used 330 buses from our existing 
bus fleet to replace service for 1.4 million customers who commute from 
Brooklyn to Manhattan every day. (Gelinas, 10) 
In the Queens Borough, the Queens Library also stood out as a model of 
community support during the aftermath of Sandy. In an area without power for several 
weeks, the manager of the library, recognizing that people needed a communal place to 
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congregate and communicate, opened the library every day and eventually got a 
generator that allowed some power and the ability for people to recharge phones and 
computers. The library was a big community morale booster and also became a large 
donation site for food and other essential goods (Gelinas 12).  
Failed areas of New York’s response include the notoriously bad New York City 
Housing Authority (NYCHA), which manages the city’s housing projects and the Long 
Island Power Authority (LIPA), which manages the power grids on Long Island. The 
NYCHA showed little foresight when it came to anticipating a need for power generators 
and replacement boilers for their over 400 buildings—they had none and made no efforts 
to get any as the storm approached. The LIPA, which is known to be a corrupt and inept 
organization, failed to keep trees adequately trimmed and cut back which allowed 
numerous power lines to be downed which could have been prevented. They also had 
antiquated computer system that made it virtually impossible for customers to 
communicate with them and for them to communicate internally (Gelinas 18).  
D. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT  
In the previous chapters on immediate and long-term response to Hurricane 
Sandy, many examples of federal, state and local contingency contracting support  
were cited. At the macro level, the degree of contracting support during Hurricane  
Sandy was staggering in terms of scope and cost. Although Sandy only affected  
the northeast portion of the United States, 34 states participated in the contracted 
recovery efforts to some degree. Figure 20 from the FederalTransparency.Gov website 
depicts the states that received contracts in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. If you go to 
http://www.federaltransparency.gov/funded/Sandy/Pages/Sandy-Award.aspx website, 
this chart is interactive and you can see the details and cost of each individual contract.  
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Figure 19.  States that received contracts during the Hurricane Sandy recovery  
(from Federal Transparency.Gov website) 
The states to receive the largest number of contract awards and value are no 
surprise; New York and New Jersey. There is a concerted effort that is regulated by law 
(part of the Stafford Act) to make every attempt to utilize local business during disaster 
relief contracting awards. As of October 3, 2013, New York had received 626 contract 
awards totaling $456,944,872. New Jersey had received 385 awards totaling 
$221,924,476 (Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board).  
Table 6 depicts just a small screenshot of a few contracts awarded in support of 
Sandy recovery efforts. Note the various agencies that awarded the contracts and the 
geographically dispersed locations of the companies that received the contracts. One 
issue worthy of mention here is that had there been more widespread use of federal, state 
and local existing pre-storm contingency contracts with local and regional business, there 
probably would not have been the need to contract with so many businesses that were 
hundreds and thousands of miles away. This would help keep the recovery phase in line 
with the Stafford Act’s intent, make the response more responsive, and support local and 
regional businesses. Possibly the biggest benefit though would be to reduce the number 
of contracting actions done in a post-storm emotionally charged environment when 
competition is often not used for the sake of expediency and Justification and Approvals 




Table 6.   Various contracts awarded during Hurricane Sandy recovery (from Federal Transparency.Gov website) 
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E. FUNDING  
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act regulates 
federal funding for disaster relief. This Act, which is essentially the 1974 Disaster Relief 
Act with a number of added Amendments states that:  
(1) federal assistance supplements state and local relief and recovery 
efforts and, (2) is triggered only by a presidential declaration that is 
preceded by a gubernatorial request for assistance. (7) 
While the federal government is supposed to “supplement” state and local 
recovery efforts, the reality is that for significant disasters the cost of recovery is 
immense and state and local funds are woefully short of requirements. For the preparation 
stage and immediate response of Hurricane Sandy, FEMA and other organizations 
utilized existing funds, knowing that additional appropriations would be forthcoming.  
On December 7, 2012 President Obama requested $61 billion to support 
Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts. On December 28th the senate passed H.R. 1 in the 
amount of $61 billion, the House then passed H.R. 41 on January 4, 2013 and finally 
H.R. 152, which ultimately appropriated $60.4 billion for Hurricane Sandy recovery 
efforts. The resolution was entered into law as Public Law 113–2, H.R. 152, 127 Stat 4 
and was signed by the president on January 29, 2013. The law contained two parts; 
Division A: Disaster Relief Appropriations Act 2013 and Division B: Sandy Recovery 
Improvement Act of 2013 (Wikipedia).  
The financial burden for the Hurricane Sandy recovery has been staggering. One 
year after Sandy, FEMA had spent $1.4 billion on individual assistance to 182,000 
survivors, $2.4 billion in Small Business loans, $7.9 billion in National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) payments and $3.2 billion in recovery contracts for debris removal, 
infrastructure rebuilding and other emergency work (FEMA). And this is just for FEMA; 
there are many other organizations with Sandy bills to pay. Table 8, from Recovery 
Accountability and Transparency Board for Hurricane Sandy Funding, breaks down the 
appropriations by federal agency and accounts for the effects of sequestration. Note that 
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the total does not equal the $60.4B in H.R. 152 due to the NFIP and other smaller funding 
actions not being included in the chart. 
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Agency Total Appropriation Adjusted Appropriation 
Department of Agriculture $228,400,000 $216,980,000 
Department of Commerce $186,000,000 $309,700,000 
Department of Defense $112,570,000 $109,473,000 
Department of Health and Human Services $800,000,000 $759,750,000 
Department of Homeland Security $12,071,908,000 $11,468,312,600 
Department of Housing and Urban Development $16,000,000,000 $15,200,000,000 
Department of Justice $21,250,000 $20,022,188 
Department of Labor $25,000,000 $23,747,000 
Department of the Interior $761,000,000 $786,718,396 
Department of Transportation $13,070,000,000 $12,416,500,000 
Department of Veteran Affairs $235,631,000 $235,631,000 
Environmental Protection Agency $607,725,000 $577,338,750 
General Services Administration $7,000,000 $6,650,000 
Legal Services Corporation $1,000,000 $950,000 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration $15,000,000 $14,250,000 
Small Business Administration $800,000,000 $764,750,000 
Smithsonian Institute $2,000,000 $1,900,000 
Social Security Administration $2,000,000 $2,000,000 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers $5,430,000,000 $5,081,084,941 
Total $50,376,484,000 $47,995,757,875 
Table 7.   Hurricane Sandy recovery; appropriations by federal agency  
(from Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board website) 
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There has been a significant amount of scrutiny regarding President Obama’s 
$60.4 billion dollar Sandy aid package—and rightly so. This is a staggering amount of 
money and some of it seems to be targeted at areas that are not directly supporting the 
recovery of Hurricane Sandy victims. Approximately $28 billion of the aid package is for 
long-term disaster mitigation projects along the eastern seaboard (Table 9) (Myer 4). This 
delves into an area that needs a much more planned and coordinated response from states 
and the federal government. Future disaster mitigation and prevention is not the intent of 
disaster relief funding under the Stafford Act. Instead, these projects should be budgeted 
for and debated like any other items that the federal government wants to spend 
taxpayer’s dollars on.  
Other portions of the funding bill are also questionable. $200 million of the bill is 
for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and is “to be used at the 
discretion of the Secretary” (Myer 5). This type of “open checkbook” funding is just bad 
government and is does not show the American people that the government respects their 
tax dollars. The Obama administration also has a $7 billion supplemental request for 
Sandy aid, which includes $50 million for dislocated worker training. This nebulous 
“worker training” term is used frequently for hazy and unfocused spending initiatives and 
it would be interesting to see a detailed breakdown of exactly what training and for whom 





Table 8.   Hurricane Sandy relief dollars being spent on future mitigation plans  
and projects (from Heritage.Org 15) 
State and local governments have also been significantly burdened by Sandy 
recovery efforts. While a detailed analysis of these agencies is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, Figure 21 below depicts just overtime spending by New York City from October 
29 to December 24, 2012. The $154 million price tag is small potatoes compared to the 
federal appropriations but it is a good example of the burden placed on local governments 




Figure 20.  New York City; Hurricane Sandy overtime costs Oct 29–Dec 24 2012  
(from New York City Budget Office website) 
F. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE AND CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
When it comes to responding to disasters as large as Hurricane Sandy, the plain 
truth is that there will NEVER be a response that meets the immediate needs of everyone 
affected and satisfies all citizens and the media. A couple of weeks after Sandy struck, on 
November 12, 2012, “Hurricane Sandy; Katrina on the Hudson” by Mary Katherine Ham 
was posted on the HotAir.com website. The article is critical of the Sandy response and 
states in part: 
It took days for FEMA to hit the ground in hard-hit parts of NYC. More 
than a week after the storm, FEMA representatives were just getting on 
the ground and opening temporary offices in New Jersey. When a 
nor’easter blew in, several of their offices shut down because of—wait for 
it—severe weather. (Morrissey)  
No doubt the response could have been better in some areas but I contend that the 
response to Hurricane Sandy, the overall effort to include DOD and contracting efforts, 
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was improved over the Hurricane Katrina response. The Sandy response also shows that 
the government, FEMA and other organizations CAN learn and make positive changes.  
As we look back on Hurricane Sandy and the preparations and recovery, there are 
many positives that emerge: 
 DLA exercising existing fuel delivery contracts prior to the storms arrival 
allowed fuel trucks to be in place when the call went out for fuel 
 Use of the DOD dual-status commander, while not an overall success the 
concept was exercised and it validated the utility and value of the concept 
 USACE use of their Advanced Contracting Initiative contracts greatly 
assisted with rapid debris removal, de-watering operations, and general 
contracting 
 FEMA and H&HS use of pre-existing contracts for ambulances and food 
 FEMA properly prepositioned personnel and equipment in targeted areas  
 Pre-storm presidential emergency declarations expedited recovery efforts, 
rapid major disaster area declarations followed quickly 
 First effective use of the Post-Katrina “Surge Capacity Force” by DHS, 
allowed for rapid call up of trained personnel in key support areas 
 Coordinating an energy restoration task force resulted in a more 
coordinated effort between utility companies to restore power 
 Effective use of WebEOC (Emergency Operations Center), a web based 
crisis management system that enhances coordination efforts by having a 
“common operating picture” that all agencies can view and interact with 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
 New York City effectively utilized a robust communications plan using 
their website, YouTube, mobile, text messages, e-mails, Twitter, telephone 
hotlines, and FaceBook (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
 Use of technology; smartphone Apps from the American Red Cross and 
FEMA proved to be very useful during preparations and recovery. The 
Red Cross App was downloaded over 100,000 times (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) 
These are all very positive events and actions and many of them, such as the DHS 
“Surge Capacity Force” are a direct result of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. 
Another clear success story was the number of organizations with pre-existing 
contingency contracts in place. In the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
of 2006 one of the items they addressed was the lack of pre-existing contracts for 
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recovery operations. The Army Corps of Engineers leads the pack in this area with their 
ACI program but many other organizations at local, state and federal levels have 
followed suit and it showed during Hurricane Sandy. 
On the other side of the coin, there are the failures of Hurricane Sandy’s 
preparations and response. The list below highlights several areas that were weak points. 
Some are new issues, but most are recurring themes, unfortunately: 
 Integrating senior leadership guidance and communications into the 
response. With multiple senior leaders from the president on down, there 
were times when leadership decisions were not communicated to the entire 
recovery team, causing confusion and lack of efficiency 
 Poor training of Recovery Support Function field coordinators. The 
coordinators knew little of the National Response Framework (NRF) and 
operated in a stove-piped fashion, unaware of their place in the broader 
picture of response 
 Inefficient FEMA mission assignment process. FEMA’s process to 
formally assign tasks to other federal agencies is cumbersome and slow. In 
many cases the “order” took over a day just to process, unacceptable 
during disaster response operations 
 Poor use of deliberate hurricane response planning that already existed 
prior to Sandy. A survey found that 64% of FEMA’s deployed personnel 
had never used or had access to existing regional hurricane response 
plans—a clear failure in leadership, information management and 
dissemination 
 Lack of training for Community Relations specialists. These people are 
the “face” of FEMA in the field and over 1,700 were deployed. About 
70% were new to the assignment and many had only received three hours 
of training 
 Poor overall communications plan. 
 Lack of communication regarding FEMA programs and processes prior to 
the disaster occurring 
 Untrained FEMA field workers who did not know what to communicate to 
survivors during the immediate response and first contact 
 Poor communication during the long term response when people were 
applying for FEMA assistance; failure to provide detailed and accurate 
information on programs and processes 
 Failure to consider that many survivors will be without power for a long 
period of time. Many survivors were told to check FEMA’s website or call 
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their hotlines for information but after a day or so batteries for computers 
and phones were dead, leaving many of the worst off with no way of 
getting information and help 
 The lack of a multi-state National Guard response framework and overall 
lack of maturity in the dual-status commander process prevented it from 
being more effective  
 Funding for Sandy relief efforts was overly aggressive and failed to 
remain focused on the immediate needs of survivors and rebuilding 
communities. Long term funding for infrastructure changes to adapt to 
climate change need to be debated in congress and budgeted for  
 The failure to evacuate more people from areas that were clearly going to 
be heavily damaged. NYC’s Zone A was identified early on as a potential 
danger area for flooding and storm surge damage and when the evacuation 
order was given, very few heeded the warning. More effort must be placed 
into enforcing evacuation orders and convincing citizens it is the right 
course of action.  
For contingency contracting specifically, the overall picture of the Hurricane 
Sandy response favors the positive. After extensive reviews of Hurricane Sandy after 
action reviews, websites, newspaper articles and government documents one is hard 
pressed to find any that highlight contracting as a significant area of failure during the 
response. FEMA’s after action hardly mentions contracting as a concern while New York 
City’s does mention the need to establish existing contingency contracts for areas such as 
boiler repair/plumbing, the need to add generator maintenance and GPS tracking to 
generator contracts and the desire to enter into their own debris removal contracts vice 
relying on the USACE. Additionally, there are hundreds of articles and reports from 
independent sources on Hurricane Sandy but very few discuss contracting at all and even 
less identifies contracting failures as significant issues.  
The USACE does make considerable mention of their Advanced Contracting 
Initiative (ACI) in their After Action report and lists it as one of their top three items of 
interest. The ACI allows the USACE to enter into contracts for typical recovery type 
services and commodities such as power, water, debris removal and roofing repair. The 
ACI program has been very successful since its inception in 1999 and highlights one of 
the most significant focal areas of disaster response and that is timeliness of response. 
With the ACI contracts already in place, delays are minimized and support is more 
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responsive. The USACE Sandy After Action makes several recommendations and 
comments regarding ACI: 
 ACI contracts are not long term solutions, only short term 
 Seek to transition from ACI contracts to local business contracts as soon 
as possible  
 Allow ten days for USACE contractor personnel turnover to ensure 
incoming personnel have adequate knowledge 
 Encourage the use of emerging technologies in ACI contracts 
 New ACI contracts will have two wage rates; metropolitan and other. 
With the success of the USACE ACI program and the other successes seen by 
DLA with standing fuel contracts and DOT with standing ambulance contracts, it seems 
very apparent that there is a steady shift toward response agencies maintaining standing 
response contracts instead of just waiting for the disaster to occur and then starting the 
process.  
G. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After action reports, agency briefs, and scholarly articles are filled with lessons 
learned and recommendations for the post Hurricane Sandy world—an entire book could 
be written on the subject. Below are the lessons learned and recommendations that I 
believe are most important and relevant from Sandy: 
 FEMA still has not learned to focus enough on the survivor during the 
early stages of recovery. The emotional trauma and shock of victims is 
significant, FEMA needs to get more trained personnel into the affected 
areas as soon as it is safe to do so. FEMA personnel should not arrive 
without food, water, and clear information and instructions for the 
survivors 
 FEMA needs to create a new four tiered communications plan:  
 In the preparations stage of a disaster, FEMA needs to push information to 
people regarding what policies and programs will apply in the aftermath 
and how they function. Use EVERY available and modern 
communications means possible 
 During the initial recovery stage of the disaster put people in the field who 
understand survivors immediate needs and know what they are talking 
about regarding FEMAs support plan 
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 During the long term recovery phase when people are applying for 
assistance, FEMA must articulate to them how FEMA programs work and 
interact with other recovery programs (such as private insurance and state 
run programs) 
 Follow up and communicate with people who have applied for assistance. 
Recordings do not cut it, it may mean long wait times but survivors need a 
voice on the other end to talk to for something as serious as recovering 
from a major disaster 
 Prepositioning of critical recovery items works, continue to expand these 
efforts. History has shown that food, water, blankets, temporary shelters, 
generators, fuel, and medical supplies will all be needed in great 
quantities. Caution; committing to prepositioning areas when the storm 
track is still questionable can be disastrous 
 The USACE, DLA, H&HS and New York all got it right with their pre-
existing contingency contracts for services and commodities. All federal, 
state and local agencies should consider these types of contracts and 
relationships with businesses to minimize delay the preparations and 
response phases 
 In urban areas such as New York City and Boston, high numbers of skilled 
technicians such as plumbers and electricians will be needed. Because of 
large numbers of housing units and high capacity buildings, a single 
failure could mean 400 residents are homeless. Establish standing 
contingency contracts for critical technicians 
 Use technology to the greatest extent possible, especially for mass 
communication and coordinating response efforts. New York City’s 
communication plan was exceptional and effective. WebEOC proved to be 
effective for FEMA as a coordination tool with supporting agencies. The 
use of smartphone Apps was a first during a disaster response and also 
proved to be effective and highly utilized. As technologies become more 
advanced, fund and implement them into standing response plans 
 In areas prone to flooding or when flooding is anticipated, consider 
standing contingency contracts for towing and vehicle removal services. 
New York City was unprepared for the number of derelict vehicles and 
wayward boats that blocked streets and hindered first responders and 
logistics movements 
 The Rapid Repairs and Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power 
programs are good programs and the concept of getting residents back into 
their houses vice in hotels and temporary shelters is a great one. In high 
risk areas, states and large cities should enter into contingency contracts 
with general contractors to facilitate repair work beginning immediately 
after a disaster 
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 The DOD “dual-status commander” concept is sound and needs to be 
exercised further to refine it and make it more effective. DOD, DHS and 
state governors need to continue to devote resources to this effort to make 
it work. The unity of command problem has been a post-disaster after 
action item for too long and the dual status commander will help eliminate 
this 
 More realistic and coordinated DOD/DHS/multi-state training is needed. 
The U.S. currently has a National Exercise Program (NEP) that is 
managed by FEMA. Biennial training cycles already exist, we must get 
more realistic and focused training accomplished to decrease actual 
response times and minimize the friction that occurs at the seams of 
participating organizations 
 Title 10 (active duty) military forces will remain focused on fighting and 
winning against our adversaries; this will not change. Title 32 forces 
(National Guard) must accept a certain level of mission shift that ensures 
they are the force of choice for DOD responses to natural disasters. 
Training and funding must accompany this shift to ensure the National 
Guard is prepared to respond 
 
At the macro level, something else that must be considered too is FEMAs overall 
role in disaster response. Over the last thirty years there has been a dramatic and alarming 




Figure 21.  FEMA disaster declarations by recent presidents (from Heritage.Org 11) 
Figure 22 from the Heritage Foundation depicts the number of FEMA Disaster 
Declarations by president going back to Ronald Reagan. This trend upwards is alarming, 
costly and clearly shows the federal government “takeover” of funding disaster 
responses. We simply cannot afford to continue the trend that is ongoing.  
The Stafford Act mandates that FEMA pay for 75 to 100 percent of disaster 
response bills as long as FEMA has issued a disaster declaration. Meeting the 
requirements for a declaration is fairly simple, the disaster must be “of such severity and 
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the affected 
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local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary” (Mayer 5). The financial 
threshold for determining if FEMA funds are authorized is if a storm’s storm related 
damages reach $1.29 per capita—then it meets the criteria. For some states, this is less 
than $1 million in damages. That is far too low and only encourages governors to seek 
federal funds and not budget for state disaster relief efforts themselves.  
One idea is to increase the damage per capita amount by two to three times…..or 
possibly much more. This would encourage states to budget for disaster relief and push 
the responsibility for all but the worst disasters back to the state level. The fact is that 
neither New Jersey nor New York had a disaster relief fund prior to Hurricane Sandy and 
that clearly shows how reliant states have become on FEMA and the federal government 
to bail them out of every type of disaster scenario. Another side benefit of this would be 
that FEMA would not spend as much time responding to disasters and they could focus 
on training and equipping for the very worst-case scenarios vice lower level disasters.  
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After Hurricane Katrina a slew of new legislation was passed in an effort to better 
prepare the nation for another catastrophic event. The Post Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 was one of the more significant pieces of legislation 
and it addressed the formation of a “Contingency Contracting Corps,” changes to “pass 
thru” amounts for sub-contractors and several other contracting centric issues. The FY 
2007 John Warner National Defense Act clarified the use of National Guard troops 
during natural disasters and provided the Secretary of Defense with additional powers to 
assist during disasters and there were also amendments to the Stafford Act which 
expanded the federal government’s disaster assistance authority. Hurricane Sandy’s 
response proved that some of these pieces of legislation created positive changes while 
others were not as effective (Bea et al. 56).  
In the aftermath of Sandy changes to disaster response laws and policies are also 
taking place. The nation’s overarching response plan, the National Response Framework 
(NRF) was overhauled and a new version signed in May 2013 (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency). The new NRF incorporated many lessons learned from Sandy to 
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include a greater emphasis on the “whole community” concept during recoveries, 
clarifies the role Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and clarifies the federal role 
during non-Stafford Act incidents and recovery operations. The unpopular (with coastal 
homeowners) Biggert-Waters act was passed in the summer of 2013 that greatly 
increased the rates for flood insurance in areas that were very high risk and previously 
subsidized by the federal government.  
At the DOD level, real post-Sandy policy changes are still being staffed and 
developed but a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from September 2013 
titled “Civil Support” identified command and control during multistate civil support 
incidents and establishing a specific set of DOD capabilities that could be provided 
during disaster preparation and response as the two main weaknesses that have plagued 
DOD support during the National Level Exercise in 2011, Hurricane Sandy and the 
Boston Marathon bombing.  
In summary, Hurricane Sandy was a colossal storm that caused some of the worst 
damage ever seen by a hurricane within the United States. The response to Sandy was 
impressive in both scope and magnitude, showing that FEMA and other agencies had 
learned from past failures in some areas and made positive changes to address the 
problems. While not without failures and weakness in many areas, the overall response 
was effective, particularly when considering how large the affected area was. The 
standing contingency contracts that were executed by FEMA, DLA, and the USACE 
showed a commitment to being contractually prepared and quickly responding to disaster 
recovery efforts. At the local level in New York City, Boston and other areas, the 
contracting preparations made by cities showed that standing contingency contracts had 
become part of their disaster relief plans also.  
At the DOD level, Hurricane Sandy revealed slow progress in establishing better 
unity of command and cooperation between all components of the DOD; active, reserve 
and National Guard. The challenge with getting DOD to invest substantial resources and 
energy into policy, structure, and training to support disaster response is that the mission 
is simply not a top priority and it will remain that way unless there is significant top 
down pressure. This is not likely in my opinion as we push forward into the second 
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decade of our war against religious extremists and we also begin to focus on Asia and the 
Pacific region. It simply comes down to resources and priorities for the military and 
CONUS disaster relief will never be amongst the top priorities for the Title 10 armed 
forces of the United States of America.  
Hurricane Sandy’s response showed that progress has been made in many areas 





























VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our Joint Applied Project team picked the subject of contingency contracting in 
support of CONUS disasters because we knew that much has evolved over the last two 
decades with respect to disaster response and contingency contracting. Additionally, the 
three disasters we selected are all well documented and have aspects that are highly 
debated, emotional and controversial. For these reasons we thought the subject would be 
interesting and rewarding to research, analyze and write about. We were not 
disappointed. 
As we conclude this project, let us first answer the question of contingency 
contracting support during the three disasters we studied and analyzed; were the 
contracting efforts timely, sufficient and effective for dealing with the challenges of the 
recovery phase they were intended to address? Like many complex issues, the answer is 
yes and no. There were areas of clear success such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Advance Contracting Initiative (ACI), a standing contingency contract that the USACE 
maintains to deal with things such as debris removal and proved to be extremely 
responsive and effective, especially during Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. On the other 
hand are numerous failures that occurred such as in New Orleans during Hurricane 
Katrina where evacuation plans failed to account for a large population of elderly and 
disabled personnel and communications between federal, state and local agencies was 
dismal at best.  
What is heartening to see is that there does appear to be a “learning curve” when 
it comes to disaster response in the United States and contingency contracting in support 
of the recovery efforts. In the aftermath of each of the disasters we analyzed significant 
local, state and federal analysis of the events took place and it generally resulted in 
positive changes to policies, laws and regulations.  
Of the three disasters we analyzed, the Northridge earthquake response was 
clearly the most effective and well executed. FEMA’s response time and coordination 
efforts with local agencies such as CALTRANS and the FHWA were commendable and 
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since much of the recovery focus was on restoring transportation corridors and systems, 
the focus and level of effort placed in these areas seemed appropriate and achieved rapid 
success. Power and utility restoration was also crucial during the Northridge recovery and 
as stated in our Northridge chapter, most people in the affected areas had power restored 
within three days of the earthquake taking place. Compare this to the power restoration 
timelines for Katrina and Sandy, which in some cases took months to restore, and you 
will see that the Northridge recovery was very well executed and coordinated.  
Another area that was significant during Northridge was that of debris removal. 
With so many highways and overpasses destroyed, there were literally millions of tons of 
rubble that had to be put into trucks and hauled away to appropriate landfills and other 
locations. This effort could have significantly slowed down the recovery timeline but 
FEMA and state agencies quickly let “unit price” contracts for debris removal, along with 
USACE debris removal contracts and quickly got the debris removal issue under control. 
Unit price contracts (per cubic yard) have long been considered the most cost efficient 
contracting vehicle for disaster recovery debris removal. In the case of Northridge, over 7 
million cubic yards of debris was removed and as is the case with most disaster 
recoveries, debris removal was one of the most significant costs incurred by FEMA and 
state agencies.  
One interesting and significant federal policy change that occurred during the 
recovery of Northridge was that of rebuilding infrastructure to higher and more expensive 
standards than what had been in existence and destroyed by the earthquake. Previous to 
Northridge, the federal policy was to rebuild roadways and bridges to the standard and 
level of quality that previously existed. However, President Clinton changed that and at 
significant cost to federal tax-payers, had California’s transportation infrastructure rebuilt 
to more earthquake resistant standards that significantly enhanced the structural 
soundness of all the rebuilt roads, bridges and overpasses. Whether or not the increased 
costs for this should have been born by federal taxpayers versus the state of California are 
debatable. Nevertheless, it set a new standard for earthquake recovery and rebuilding and 
make California’s roadways more prepared to handle the next big earthquake that 
happens in that region. 
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Hurricane Katrina presented an immense challenge to FEMA and every other 
federal, state and local agency involved in the recovery efforts. Unlike the Northridge 
earthquake which lasted for 45 seconds and had a more focused level of destruction, 
Katrina pounded the southern coast for hours and brought flooding, wind damage, power 
less and property destruction to a huge swath of territory, although the worst of the 
storm’s damage was centered around New Orleans. New Orleans unfortunately was 
largely below sea level and was protected by a fragile system of levees and dykes that 
proved to be incapable of holding back the surging waters that Katrina delivered.  
Another aspect of Katrina that is often overlooked and not discussed is that the 
area affected is largely a lower income and less affluent areas than the Los Angeles area 
that was affected by the Northridge earthquake. One has to wonder if a regions socio-
economic status has any bearing on disaster response, perhaps a good subject for a future 
Naval Postgraduate School Joint Applied Project.  
FEMA’s response to Katrina has been one of the most well document subjects in 
recent history when it comes to natural disasters in the United States. One of the more 
interesting aspects of Hurricane Katrina is that just a year before the hurricane struck, an 
exercise was conducted for a notional hurricane (Hurricane Pam) with a goal of 
exercising the response to a destructive hurricane in the Louisiana area. The Hurricane 
Pam exercise had limited participation and certainly not all the key players were present, 
particularly DOD who would later play a huge role during the immediate aftermath of 
Katrina. However, the exercise was a step in the right direction toward better 
preparedness but showed how challenging it is to get all the disparate organizations 
together for “only” an exercise and how hard it is to push lessons learned to organizations 
such as DOD who have fighting wars as their primary mission, not CONUS disaster 
recovery.  
The failures of contracting during Katrina are numerous. About the only thing that 
seemed to go right were the USACE debris removal plans and use of their Advanced 
Contracting Initiative (ACI) where they already had standing contingency contracts with 
regional companies for debris removal services. These contracts could be activated 
quickly and prevented the need for hasty “no bid” contracts with associated inflated 
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prices for much of the debris removal services that were needed. Aside from the ACI 
successes, one has to look long and hard to find similar success stories when it comes to 
contracting. Inflated cost no-bid contracts were used by FEMA repeatedly during the 
Karina recovery due to the lack of relevant standing contingency contracts for items such 
as food, water, shelter and even body recovery. The body recovery subject was an 
emotional issue where for days the state battled with the federal government over who 
was responsible for removing bodies in the aftermath of Katrina. In the end the state was 
forced to contract with a private company for their removal but the fact that this issue was 
delayed for days as bloated corpses floated in the water around New Orleans highlight the 
fact that preparations for a serious hurricane recovery in the region had never really been 
though through by anyone. 
There were several noteworthy policy and regulation changes made during the 
aftermath of Katrina. In direct response to the inordinate number of hasty and costly no-
bid contracts, a new limit of 150 days on no-bid contracts was imposed by the federal 
government.  
The most significant policy change was the Post Hurricane Katrina Reform Act of 
2006. This Act significantly reorganized FEMA, expanded their statutory authority, and 
mandated new requirements on the agency. The Act also created what is known as the 
“Surge Capacity Force” in response to a lack of qualified manpower for FEMA to pull 
from during the Katrina recovery. This concept is a sound one since only so many full 
time FEMA employees are on staff at any given time, the surge force allows FEMA to 
reach out to other government organizations and pull qualified personnel to build up the 
FEMA disaster response workforce for a specific response and duration of time. This is 
sound and common sense policy and it was put to good use during the Hurricane Sandy 
response a few years later.  
Two other noteworthy issues that were part of the 2006 Act were the FEMA 
Strategic Human Capital Plan and enhanced training opportunities for Contingency 
Contracting officers and other disaster response personnel. The Strategic Human Capital 
Plan was designed to recruit and retain the best and brightest into FEMA and to ensure 
that analysis was done to determine what types of personnel were needed. While this 
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might sound like an intrinsic requirement for any organization, apparently at FEMA this 
type of manpower planning was not present so the Strategic Human Capital plan created 
and formalized it. The enhanced training opportunities created under the Act allowed for 
funding to better train FEMA personnel, Contingency Contracting Officers, and others 
such as those who would be part of the Surge Capacity Force.  
Hurricane Sandy in 2012, like Katrina, was an immense storm that left incredible 
devastation in its wake. However, the response to Sandy was improved over that of 
Katrina and while not without significant issues, did show that FEMA had learned and 
adapted in the years since Katrina.  
The concept of the Surge Capacity Force, developed in the aftermath of Katrina 
was first used during Hurricane Sandy’s recovery and while not perfect, did allow FEMA 
to augment its core workforce with personnel (some qualified, some not) to assist with 
Sandy recovery operations. The Surge Capacity Force is a step in the right direction and 
with further refinement and use, will prove to be an invaluable part of FEMAs overall 
manpower plans.  
Other noteworthy successes during Sandy’s recovery were FEMA’s Rapid 
Repairs and Sheltering program and New York City’s Temporary Essential Power 
Program. Both programs sought to get families displaced from their residences by storm 
damage back into their homes as quickly as possible by conducting some minimal repairs 
to their properties to restore essential utilities such as power, water and plumbing. The 
programs were generated with the intent to reduce the number of homeless personnel that 
FEMA had to shelter and a side benefit would be keeping people and in their 
communities where they could help others and assist with local rebuilding efforts. These 
programs were already contracted for by FEMA and NYC (carpenters, plumbers, 
electricians etc.) so when they were put into action, the costs were already negotiated and 
the qualifications of the vendors were already verified—a significant factor since there 
are many instances of unscrupulous and non-certified contractors showing up in storm 
ravaged areas and taking advantage of citizens in dire need of home repairs.  
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The DOD played a significant role during the Hurricane Sandy response and it 
was the first time that the concept of the “dual-status” commander was exercised. This 
concept was created several years prior with the goal of a more unified command 
structure for all military personnel who were supporting a CONUS disaster recovery 
event. Often unknown by the general public but National Guard troops from individual 
states are “owned” by the state’s governor and operate under a USC Title 32 status. 
Active duty federal troops are “owned” by the President and Secretary of Defense and 
operate under a USC Title 10 status. This creates confusion and lack of unity of 
command when both types of troops are present during a recovery—which history has 
shown they normally are. The dual-status commander is a specially trained and 
authorized National Guard or active duty officer who can legally be in charge of both 
Title 10 and 32 troops. This concept is a great idea and was exercised during Sandy with 
some success. With more national level training events and use during real world disaster 
responses, the dual-status commander concept will gain acceptance throughout the DOD 
and National Guard units and will greatly enhance the coordination of the overall military 
response during CONUS disaster recoveries.  
One significant failure during FEMA’s response during Sandy was their 
communications plan with the survivors of the hurricane. FEMA just did not effectively 
communicate information regarding FEMA programs, how to apply for them, what the 
details were and all the nuances that go with any federal process. Survivors were left 
frustrated and furious, unable to reach FEMA personnel or just getting recording that said 
they “did not qualify” for a specific program. FEMA has go to do much better than this 
with an emphasis on getting information pushed out to a potentially affected area several 
days prior to a storm arriving. Sandy and Katrina were forecast incredibly accurately, 
with that capability potentially affected personnel should be reading about FEMA 
programs and processes as the storm approaches, not in the aftermath when power is out 
and computers and smartphones batteries go dead and there is no time to read up on the 
programs—and other more urgent priorities emerge. 
Like Katrina, Sandy spawned several significant policy changes in her aftermath. 
The National Response Framework (NRF) was re-written with a greater emphasis on the 
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“whole community” concept during disaster recovery. This concept seeks to better 
coordinate all resources, both public and private, and bring them to bear in concert vice 
having them be separate efforts. This too is a step in the right direction and with further 
refinement and use, will enhance the overall response efforts put forth during future 
disaster responses. The highly contentious Biggert-Waters Act was passed in the summer 
of 2013 and significantly increased the insurance costs of coastal homeowners who live 
in flood prone areas and have a higher likely hood of storm damage and flooding during 
nor’-easters and hurricanes. This legislation just makes sense given the immense cost of 
coastal rebuilding and the knowledge we have of current and foreseeable future weather 
patterns. Coastal homeowners are simply going to have to bear more of the burden for 
preparation and recovery costs in areas they choose to live and build in that are clearly 
higher risk than more inland areas.  
Based on our analysis of these three disasters and the responses for each, we make 
the following recommendations to make disaster response plans and policies more 
efficient at the federal, state and local levels: 
 The use of standing contingency contracts is essential for timely and 
effective disaster response. The chaos and stress of disaster recovery is no 
time to negotiate a contract for critical services. The results are usually no-
bid contracts that are far too costly and might not deliver the desired 
results. All essential services such as debris removal, construction, water, 
food and sanitation all need to be on contract and ready for execution. The 
USACE ACI for debris removal stands as a model of efficiency when it 
comes to this area. 
 When entering into standing contingency contracts, the use of local 
businesses is mandated by the Stafford Act to a certain extent and just 
makes sense otherwise. A note of caution however since the local 
businesses on contract to supply services might also be affected by the 
natural disaster and be unable to comply with their contract. Consideration 
should given to having both local and out of state contracts to ensure that 
someone will be available to provide critical services when needed.  
 Restoration of utilities and getting people back into their homes as soon as 
possible should be a goal during all recoveries. The Sheltering and 
Temporary Essential Power (STEP) program operated during Hurricane 
Sandy’s recovery was effective at minimizing the number of homeless 
personnel FEMA had to deal with and it kept people in their local 
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communities; their comfort zones where they could do the most good for 
others. 
 The military dual-status commander concept is sound and should continue 
to be exercised during national level exercises and future real-world 
disaster recoveries. A coordinated military response is essential to all 
large- scale recoveries and unity of command is the first step to ensuring 
that. All military troops, both National Guard and active duty must fall 
under one command structure to achieve peak efficiency.  
 National level exercises must continue to be funded and supported by the 
President, congress, DOD, FEMA etc. With funding, leadership and 
planning, national level disaster response exercises can be effective at 
building relationships between supporting agencies, exposing weaknesses 
in plans, and maintaining a core of experienced personnel in all agencies 
expected to take part in real-world disaster recoveries. 
 FEMA must have a more robust and effective communication plan in 
place prior to a hurricane striking. Potentially affected personnel must be 
pushed information via television, the Internet, Smart Phone apps, 
telephone recordings and whatever else might work. Persons in potentially 
affected areas should have a working knowledge of what to expect from 
FEMA during the recovery phase to include where shelters will be, where 
FEMA locations will be, what FEMA programs exist and how to apply for 
them in the event their property is destroyed, where medical facilities will 
be and who to contact regarding utilities outages. FEMA should expect 
power outages and loss of Internet access and dead batteries in computers 
and smart phones for citizens in affected areas. Electronic communications 
will not be very effective during the initial response phase when power is 
out.  
 The FEMA Surge Capacity Force developed post Hurricane Katrina was 
exercised with some success during the Hurricane Sandy recovery and 
should continue to be exercised during national level exercises and real-
world disaster response. This construct of maintaining a core of qualified 
personnel who are then augmented by the Surge Capacity Force seems to 
be the only logical and fiscally possible way to augment the FEMA team 
with trained and competent personnel during a disaster response. 
 Funding for DOD and other federal Contracting Officers training must 
continue to be budgeted for. This will take leadership and planning from 
many government organizations but the payoff will be substantial during 
routine contracting actions and contingency type contracting actions that 
take place during disaster response. Government contracting is a complex 
world that is heavily regulated. It will take significant training to ensure 
Contracting Officers who are authorized to bind the U.S. Government and 
spend taxpayer’s dollars are doing so within the laws and policies in 
existence.  
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 Areas that are likely to be struck by natural disasters need to have up to 
date and efficient evacuation plans in place. In both Katrina and Sandy, 
most citizens failed to heed the order to evacuate the areas, greatly 
compounding the recovery process due to so many people being homeless 
or injured who should have left in the first place. Consideration must be 
given for areas with high density populations of elderly and disabled 
citizens, their evacuation will take substantially more effort and assistance 
from local, state, and federal agencies but they are also the ones most at 
risk to be killed or injured.  
 The costs for natural disaster responses within the CONUS continue to 
rise. Weather predictions for the future foretell of increased hurricanes and 
destructive weather phenomena. The federal government cannot afford to 
continue to pay for the vast majority of responses like those for Katrina 
and Sandy. We recommend a federal commission be created to investigate 
ways to fairly cost share the burden of disaster response, particularly in 
areas that are very likely to be damaged repeatedly in years to come. This 
commission also needs to consider whether some areas should simply be 
excluded from consideration for post disaster rebuilding due to the 
incredibly high risk that comes with building and living in some coastal 
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